even though the offspring be the child of the usurper himself. The jurists disagree only when the mother has died. Mālik rules that the owner is free to choose between taking the offspring or demanding the value of the mother, whereas al-Shāfiʿī holds that the usurper must return both the offspring and the value of the mother; this, he says, is the proper analogy.

If what issues from the object appears in a species and form other than that of the original, there are two opinions:

1. The new product belongs to the usurper.
2. He must restore it together with the usurped article if the latter is still extant, or pay its value should he claim it has perished and no evidence exists save his own word. Should the original object itself perish, the owner may choose either to exact its value—receiving nothing of the yield—or to take the yield, thereby waiving any claim to the value.

As for returns that are not progeny, the scholars have five views:

1. The usurper is not required to return them at all, without distinction.
2. He is absolutely required to return them.
3. He must return them if he leased the property, but not if he used it himself or left it idle.
4. He must return them if he leased it or used it, but not if he left it idle.
5. A distinction is drawn between livestock and immovable assets: he must pay the value of the usufruct of fixed assets, but not that of animals.

Everything thus far concerns yield extracted from the usurped object while that object remains intact and present. When profit is realized by disposing of the object and altering its very substance—such as seizing dinars, trading with them, and turning a profit—the profit belongs to the usurper according to the single established view in the Mālikī school, though some maintain it belongs to the owner. This, too, presumes that the usurper intended to seize the principal. If, however, he aimed only at the yield and not at the principal, he is liable for the yield without reservation, whether he left the property idle, used it, or leased it, and whether the usufruct is separable from the asset or not.

Abū Ḥanīfah says that one who trespasses against another man’s beast, mounts it, or loads it owes no hire for the riding or the loading, because he is already liable for the animal itself should it perish through his trespass. The same, he holds, applies to every movable chattel: once trespass has rendered him liable for the object and its value rests in his debt, the benefit is permissible to him—just as the Mālikīs argue in the case of trading with usurped capital, the difference being that in trade the substance of the capital is transformed, whereas in riding the animal it remains unchanged.

Their dispute over whether the usurper must return the yield or not ultimately turns on how they read the Prophet’s, peace and blessings be upon him, words: “The yield accompanies liability,” and his saying: “No right accrues to a wrongful root.”