In some versions the wording is: “Rather, it is a loan for use that must be returned,” while another narration from him reads: “The borrower bears no liability.” Whoever preferred this latter wording absolved the borrower of liability; whoever relied on the report of Ṣafwān ibn Umayyah imposed liability; and whoever sought to reconcile the texts distinguished between items that are prone to loss and those that are not, applying liability to the former and none to the latter. Still, the narration saying “The borrower bears no liability” is not well-known, whereas the ḥadīth of Ṣafwān is sound. Those who deny liability compare the ʿāriyah to a deposit in trust (wadīʿah), while those who differentiate reply that a deposit is held for the owner’s benefit, whereas a loan for use is held for the borrower’s benefit.

The jurists agree that leased property is not guaranteed—this being the view of al-Shāfiʿī, Abū Ḥanīfah, and Mālik. Al-Shāfiʿī argues that if one concedes there is no liability in leasing, then there should likewise be none in a loan for use—provided that liability is thought to arise from mere benefit—for if no liability is incurred when the item is taken for the benefit of both parties, it is even less fitting to impose liability when it is taken solely for the owner’s benefit, assuming that the owner’s benefit is what removes liability.

They disagreed, however, when liability is expressly stipulated. One group holds that the borrower then becomes liable; another says he does not and that the stipulation is void. According to Mālik, if liability is stipulated where it would not otherwise apply, the borrower must pay the going rental value for having used the item, because the condition shifts the transaction from gratuitous lending to the realm of a defective lease. Since the owner consented to lend only on condition that the item remain under the borrower’s guarantee, the arrangement involves an unknown consideration that must be reduced to a known amount.

Mālik and al-Shāfiʿī also differed when the borrower has planted or built something and the agreed period expires. Mālik holds that the owner may choose: either compel the borrower to uproot and demolish, or take the plants and structures at their post-removal value, provided they retain value after removal. This applies whether the period was fixed by stipulation, by common practice, or by customary usage.

Al-Shāfiʿī, by contrast, maintains that if removal was not stipulated, the owner may not demand it. Rather, the lender is offered three options: to let the plants or structures remain for a rent, to have them removed for compensation, or to purchase them outright. Whichever option the lender selects is binding on the borrower; if he refuses, he must vacate the property. Al-Shāfiʿī further records disagreement over whether such items may be sold for demolition, since they are subject to removal.

Thus al-Shāfiʿī regards forcing the borrower to uproot without compensation as injustice, whereas Mālik requires the premises to be cleared and treats prevailing custom as the equivalent of an explicit condition. Mālik also holds that if the borrower uses the article in a manner that diminishes it beyond the permitted use, he is liable for the resulting depreciation.