As for its conflict with analogy: one can readily envisage her attaining sound judgment before the fixed period they stipulate.

Proceeding on Mālik’s view—as distinct from that of the majority—that for male wards who have fathers the two criteria are puberty and the discernible presence of sound judgment, Mālik’s own statements diverge in the following case: a youth reaches puberty, yet nothing is known of his prudence or folly and his status is therefore unclear. One report from Mālik— the celebrated opinion—presumes him to be foolish until his sound judgment becomes evident. A second report presumes him prudent until his folly is proven.

As for those under testamentary guardians, the well-known position attributed to Mālik is that they do not leave the guardian’s authority unless the guardian formally lifts the interdiction by declaring the ward prudent—this when the guardian was appointed by the father, about which there is no disagreement. If the guardian was appointed by someone other than the father, his release additionally requires the judge’s permission, and there is debate on the matter. Some hold that even the father’s testamentary guardian is not believed when he pronounces the ward prudent until that prudence is independently established. Others maintain that the guardian’s role mirrors that of the father: once he perceives prudence in the ward, the latter is freed from interdiction even if the guardian issues no formal statement in the presence of witnesses; in cases of unknown status, the ruling is the same as for an unknown-status ward who has a father.

Ibn al-Qāsim’s position is that the mere existence of guardianship is immaterial: once prudence is established guardianship is disregarded, and conversely its lapse is irrelevant if folly is proved. This too is reported from Mālik, but with respect to the orphan boy, not the virgin girl. The practical difference between the two approaches is that those who insist on the guardian’s formal release void all of the ward’s transactions—even when prudence is apparent—until that release is issued; this, however, is a weak opinion, for what truly counts is prudence itself, not the judge’s decree.

Regarding the very definition of sound judgment, Mālik restricts it to the capacity to invest and safeguard property, whereas al-Shāfiʿī adds the requirement of uprightness in religion. The crux of their disagreement is whether the term “sound judgment” may be applied to someone who is not religiously upright.

A virgin girl under a testamentary guardian stands, in principle, on the same footing as a male: she does not leave guardianship unless formally released, unless she remains unmarried into advanced age—a point over which there is disagreement. Another view, attributed to Ibn al-Mājishūn, equates her status with a guardian to her status with her father. They all agree, however, that prudence is not a prerequisite for her release, unlike the dispute concerning the orphan boy.

Concerning a neglected male—one who reaches puberty with neither father nor guardian—the prevalent view is that all his dealings are valid from the moment he attains puberty, whether his folly is chronic or occasional, public or concealed. Ibn al-Qāsim, by contrast, assesses each act individually: if it reflects prudence it is upheld, otherwise it is set aside.

As for an orphan girl who has no father and no guardian, the school holds two opinions. One affirms the validity of her dealings once she begins menstruation. The other—the authoritative view—invalidates her transactions until she remains unmarried into later maturity.