Mālik said: If the pledgee claims that his ratification of the sale is only to obtain his right more quickly, he must swear to that, and the ratification stands in his favor.

Some jurists, however, hold that the pledger’s sale is valid in any case.

If the pledged property is a male or female slave and the pledger sets him or her free, Mālik rules that, should the pledger be solvent, the emancipation is effective and he must immediately pay the pledgee his due; but if he is insolvent, the slave is to be sold and the debt satisfied from the proceeds.

Al-Shāfiʿī offers three opinions: to revoke the emancipation, to ratify it, or—thirdly—a ruling identical to Mālik’s.

When the pledger and the pledgee disagree over the amount of the debt for which the pledge was given, the jurists diverge. Mālik maintains that the pledgee’s word is accepted concerning the amount, so long as it does not exceed the value of the pledge; for any excess, the pledger’s statement prevails. Al-Shāfiʿī, Abū Ḥanīfah, Sufyān al-Thawrī, and the great majority of jurists hold that the pledger’s word is authoritative.

The majority argue that the pledger is the one against whom the claim is directed, while the pledgee is the claimant; therefore, in line with the well-known Sunnah, the oath rests with the pledger. Mālik counters that although the pledgee is technically the claimant, the pledge itself serves as a “witness” in his favor, giving him a presumption strong enough to shift the oath to him. A principle of Mālik is that the party whose case is supported by the stronger presumption must swear. The majority reject this, noting that a pledger may offer collateral worth more than the debt secured.

If the pledge is destroyed and the two parties differ over its description, Mālik accepts the pledgee’s statement, because the pledgee is the defendant yet admits part of what is claimed—consistent with Mālik’s general rules, for the pledgee remains liable where concealment is possible. According to al-Shāfiʿī’s principles, no oath is imposed on the pledgee unless the pledger accuses him of having caused the loss. Abū Ḥanīfah, for his part, treats the pledgee’s word as decisive regarding the pledge’s value and requires no description, whereas Mālik obliges him to swear to both the description and its assessed value.

If they disagree about both the description of the pledge and the amount of the debt, the pledgee’s word is accepted concerning the description, and—regarding the debt—only up to the amount for which the value of the pledge, given that description, supports his claim; this view, however, is weak.

When they agree on the debt but differ over the value of the pledge, does the debt testify to the pledge’s value? Within the school there are two opinions; the view closer to analogy is that it does, for if the pledge stands as evidence for the debt, the debt likewise stands as evidence for the pledged property.

The subsidiary questions in this chapter are many, but what we have set forth is sufficient for our purpose.