The main proof offered by those who hold that the increase and yield of the pledged property belong to the pledger is the Prophet’s—peace and blessings be upon him—statement:
“A pledged animal may be milked and ridden.”
They argue that his words “ridden and milked” cannot be taken to mean that the pledger himself rides and milks the animal, for in that case it would not be in the pledgee’s possession, whereas possession is a condition of a valid pledge. Nor can the words be interpreted to refer to the pledgee’s riding and milking it. The only remaining sense, therefore, is that the hire for riding the animal is due to its owner, while its upkeep remains his responsibility.

They also cite the general wording of his—peace and blessings be upon him—saying:
“The pledge remains the property of the one who pledged it; its profit is his and its loss is upon him.”
They add that the increase constitutes something over and above what the pledgee accepted as collateral, and thus may not accrue to him without a separate stipulation.

Abū Ḥanīfah’s principal argument is that offshoots follow their principal, so they take the same legal ruling; for that reason the status of a child follows that of its mother in cases of conditional manumission (tadbīr) and contractual manumission (kitābah).

Mālik, for his part, argues that a child’s status in a sale mirrors that of its mother—i.e., it is inseparable from her—and he differentiates between fruit and offspring on the basis of the Sunnah, which makes precisely that distinction: fruit does not follow the sale of the tree unless expressly stipulated, whereas the child of a female slave follows her sale without any stipulation. The majority nonetheless hold that the pledgee has no right to derive benefit from the pledge at all.

Some scholars, however, state that when the collateral is a living animal the pledgee may milk it and ride it in proportion to what he spends on feeding and maintaining it; this is the view of Aḥmad and Isḥāq. Their proof is the tradition narrated by Abū Hurayrah from the Prophet—peace and blessings be upon him—who said:
“A pledged animal may be milked and ridden.”

Under the same heading falls their disagreement over who bears liability when the pledge is destroyed while in the pledgee’s custody. One group maintains that the pledge is a trust that remains the property of the pledger; therefore, the pledgee’s statement—accompanied by an oath that he was neither negligent nor aggressive—is accepted. This is the opinion of al-Shāfiʿī, Aḥmad, Abū Thawr, and the majority of the ḥadīth scholars.

Another group holds that the pledge falls under the pledgee’s liability and that any loss is borne by him. This is the position of Abū Ḥanīfah and most of the Kūfan jurists.

Those who impose liability divide into two camps. Some say that the pledge is guaranteed for whichever is less—its value or the amount of the debt; this is the view of Abū Ḥanīfah, Sufyān, and others. Others say it is guaranteed for its full value, whether greater or less; if anything remains for the pledger beyond the amount of the debt, he takes it from the pledgee. This was the opinion of ʿAlī ibn Abī Ṭālib, ʿAṭāʾ, and Isḥāq.

Yet another group distinguishes between property whose loss cannot easily be concealed—such as livestock and real estate—and that which can, namely movables. They hold that the pledgee is liable for what can be concealed and merely a trustee for what cannot. This is the view of Mālik, al-Awzāʿī, and ʿUthmān al-Battī, except that Mālik adds: if witnesses