cultivating the land. The same distinction applies whether the asset is one that can be moved and transported or one that is immovable.

As for what can be moved and transported, Mālik and his associates rule that allotting its usufruct for a long period is impermissible, whereas it is permissible for a short period, whether the aim is to collect revenue (ightilāl) or merely to benefit from its use (intifāʿ).

With respect to what is immovable and non-transferable, allotment is permissible for an extended term and a distant deadline, again whether the purpose is revenue or simple use.

The jurists disagree over the definition of “short period” in the case of movable property intended for revenue-yielding use. One opinion restricts it to a single day or the like; another maintains that such allotment is not permissible at all for an animal or a slave.

Regarding personal service, one view allows it for roughly five days, while another extends it to a month—and a little beyond a month.

As for allotment by items themselves (tahāyuʾ al-aʿyān)—for example, one partner’s using this house for a certain period while the other uses that house for the same period—one opinion permits it for residing in a house and cultivating land but not for taking produce or rental income except for a very short time. A second opinion allows it by analogy with time-based allotment. The same disagreement applies to the service of slaves and the use of riding animals; their ruling follows the dispute over time-based division of their benefit.

Such, then, is the discussion of the different modes of partition concerning slaves, usufructs, and the conditions that validate or nullify them. What remains in this book is the treatment of the legal rulings.

[Chapter Two: On the Rulings of Partition]

Partition is a binding contract; neither of the two parties may annul it or retract from it except when supervening circumstances arise. These contingencies are three: (1) unfair disparity (ghabn), (2) the discovery of a defect, or (3) a third-party claim of rightful ownership (istihqāq).

1. Disparity: Disparity warrants rescission only in a partition effected by drawing lots, by unanimous agreement within the school—except according to those who, by analogy with sales, hold disparity to have legal effect; on their view it would likewise affect partition.

2. Rescission for defect: According to Ibn al-Qāsim, the defect may be found either in the greater part of one’s share or in the lesser part.
   • If the defect is in the greater part of his share, one must consider whether the partner’s share has perished or not. If it has perished, the party discovering the defect returns his share to the partnership and takes from his partner half the value of his share as of the day he received it. If it has not perished, the partition is annulled and the partnership reverts to its original state.
   • If the defect is in the lesser part, he returns only that lesser portion to the partnership, whether his partner’s share has perished or not, and he recovers from his partner half the value of the excess. He has no further claim upon anything still in his possession, even if it remains with the defect.

Ashhab remarked: The circumstances that bar rescission have already been discussed in the Book of Sales.

ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz ibn al-Mājishūn said: The presence of a defect nullifies a partition effected by lot but not one concluded by mutual consent; the latter is effectively a sale, whereas the former is merely the delineation of rights. Hence, if a partition by lot may be rescinded for disparity, it must likewise be rescinded for defect.

3. Third-party claim: The ruling on a claim of ownership, according to Ibn al-Qāsim, follows the same principles as rescission for defect: if the portion successfully claimed is substantial and the partner’s share has not