benefits that either of the two parties stipulates exclusively for himself, even though they are not inherent in the capital, as well as every qirāḍ rendered invalid because of excessive uncertainty or ignorance. This is the opinion of Mutarrif, Ibn Nāfiʿ, Ibn ʿAbd al-Ḥakam, and Aṣbagh, and it was the view chosen by Ibn Ḥabīb.

Ibn al-Qāsim, however, expressed two different positions regarding invalid qirāḍ contracts. In most cases he said the agent is entitled to the customary wage, while in some he said the case should revert to an equivalent qirāḍ. Scholars have therefore differed over how to interpret his words. Some link the discrepancy to the distinction adopted by Ibn ʿAbd al-Ḥakam and Mutarrif—an interpretation favored by Ibn Ḥabīb and by my grandfather, may God have mercy on him. Others offer no such explanation and maintain that Ibn al-Qāsim’s principle is that every invalid qirāḍ yields only the customary wage except in the seven situations where he explicitly ruled for an equivalent qirāḍ:

1. a qirāḍ conducted with merchandise instead of cash;
2. a qirāḍ in which the agent guarantees the capital;
3. a qirāḍ fixed to a specific term;
4. an indeterminate qirāḍ;
5. when the owner tells the agent, “Work on the basis that you have partners in the capital”;
6. when the two parties dispute and each presents a claim that bears no resemblance to the other’s, so they both swear to their respective claims;
7. when the owner hands over the capital on condition that he purchase only on credit but the agent buys for cash, or stipulates that he buy only a particular commodity that is unavailable and the agent buys something else instead.

All of these issues ought to be traced back to a single underlying rationale; otherwise they merely reflect inconsistency in Ibn al-Qāsim’s own statements. ʿAbd al-Wahhāb reports that Ibn al-Qāsim himself drew a finer distinction: if the invalidity arises from the very form of the contract, the case reverts to an equivalent qirāḍ; but if it arises from an additional benefit one party stipulated over the other, it reverts to the customary wage. The stronger view, however, is that the matter should be the reverse.

The difference between a wage and an equivalent qirāḍ is this: a wage becomes a debt owed by the owner of the capital whether or not any profit is realized, whereas an equivalent qirāḍ follows the normal rules of qirāḍ—if profit is earned the agent takes his share, and if not, he receives nothing.

Disagreement Between the Two Parties to a Qirāḍ

The jurists also diverged when the agent and the capital owner dispute the profit-sharing fraction they had agreed upon. Mālik says the agent’s word is accepted, because he is the one in whom trust has been placed; the same principle applies, in Mālik’s view, to all his claims so long as they are plausible. Al-Layth rules that the case be treated as an equivalent qirāḍ, and Mālik himself adopts this ruling when the agent’s claim appears implausible. Abū Ḥanīfah and his colleagues—joined by al-Thawrī—hold that the capital owner’s statement prevails. Al-Shāfiʿī rules that the two must swear oaths, the contract is annulled, and the agent receives the customary wage.

The root of the disagreement between Mālik and Abū Ḥanīfah lies in how they understand the ḥadīth that imposes an oath on the defendant: is the oath required simply because he is the one against whom the claim is made, or because he is usually the party with the stronger presumption? Those who take the first view say the capital owner’s statement is accepted; those who take the second say the agent’s word prevails, for he is the entrusted party. Al-Shāfiʿī, meanwhile, likened their dispute to that of two parties to a sale who differ over the price of the merchandise.

This is sufficient for the present discussion.