This second opinion was likewise adopted by Ibrāhīm al-Nakhaʿī and al-Ḥasan, and it is one of the views transmitted from al-Shāfiʿī.
A third group holds that the worker is entitled to maintenance while traveling—food and clothing—but nothing while residing at home. This is the position of Mālik, Abū Ḥanīfah, al-Thawrī, and the majority of jurists, except that Mālik adds: only if the capital can bear the expense. Al-Thawrī further says: he may spend on the outward journey but not on the return, whereas al-Layth says: he may take lunch in the town but not supper. A report from al-Shāfiʿī grants him maintenance during illness, yet the well-known view from him, in agreement with the majority, denies him maintenance when sick.
Those who disallow any maintenance argue that it constitutes an added benefit attached to the qirāḍ and is therefore impermissible, by analogy with all other benefits. Those who permit it reply that the worker must labor from the outset, and those who extend the allowance to residence liken residence to travel.
The scholars of all regions unanimously agree that the worker may not take his share of the profit except in the presence of the investor; the investor’s presence is a condition for dividing the capital and for the worker’s receipt of his portion, and it is not sufficient that he divide it merely before witnesses or anyone else.
Rulings on Unforeseen Contingencies
They differed when the worker has taken his share in the investor’s absence and the capital, or part of it, is then lost. Mālik says: if the investor had authorized him to do so, the worker’s word is accepted concerning the loss he claims. Al-Shāfiʿī, Abū Ḥanīfah, and al-Thawrī maintain that whatever the worker has taken must be returned and used to make good the principal, after which any surplus is divided between them, should there be any.
They also disagreed if the qirāḍ capital is destroyed after the worker has bought goods with it but before he pays the seller. Mālik rules that the sale is binding upon the worker; the investor may either pay the value of the goods a second time, in which case the transaction continues between them on the original qirāḍ terms, or disclaim responsibility altogether. Abū Ḥanīfah, however, obligates the investor with that purchase, likening the worker to an agent. He further states that the principal in that qirāḍ now comprises both sums—the price of the goods that perished and the second price that became due thereafter—and that the profit is not to be divided until it is realized in cash.
They further differed over the worker’s selling some of the qirāḍ merchandise to the investor himself. Mālik disapproves, Abū Ḥanīfah allows it without restriction, and al-Shāfiʿī allows it on condition that the sale price be one at which people would not ordinarily be taken advantage of. Mālik’s reason for disliking it is that the investor might give the worker a concession on the price because of the qirāḍ, thereby gaining a benefit beyond the profit stipulated.
I know of no disagreement among the jurists of the various regions that if the worker hires transport to carry the goods to another town and the freight charges consume the goods’ entire value—and even exceed it—the excess is the worker’s responsibility, not the investor’s. The investor entrusted him with the capital only so that he might trade with it; therefore any loss that befalls the capital is upon the worker, and likewise any excess cost that surpasses and consumes the capital.