Mālik holds that stipulating a guarantee introduces an added element of gharar into the very nature of the qirāḍ. Abū Ḥanīfah, by contrast, likens the clause to a corrupt condition in a sale: the sale stands while the condition falls, basing himself on the earlier ḥadīth of Barīrah.
The jurists further disagreed when the investor dictates the worker’s trading choices—such as specifying a certain commodity, a particular manner of sale, a set location for commerce, or even a class of people with whom he must trade.
Mālik, and al-Shāfiʿī in the case of naming a commodity, ruled that the stipulation is invalid unless the commodity is one whose price never fluctuates at any season of the year. Abū Ḥanīfah, however, obliges the worker to abide by what is stipulated, and if he transacts outside those limits he must guarantee the capital.
Mālik and al-Shāfiʿī see such restrictions as unduly narrowing the worker’s scope, thereby greatly increasing gharar. Abū Ḥanīfah regards the resulting uncertainty as slight; indeed, were the investor to stipulate that the worker simply refrain from buying a given commodity, the stipulation would be binding by consensus.
According to the majority, a time-limited qirāḍ is impermissible, whereas Abū Ḥanīfah allows it unless the two parties later rescind the contract. Those who forbid it argue that fixing a term constrains the worker and heightens gharar: merchandise may stagnate, and when the deadline arrives he could be forced to sell at a loss. Those who permit it assimilate qirāḍ to a lease.
Related to this is their dispute over whether the investor may make the worker responsible for the zakāt on the worker’s own share of the profit. Mālik, in the Muwaṭṭaʾ—an opinion transmitted by Ashhab—declared it invalid. Ibn al-Qāsim judged it permissible and ascribed that view to Mālik, while al-Shāfiʿī adopted Mālik’s former statement.
Those who disallow the clause argue that it renders the respective shares of investor and worker unknown: no one knows how much capital will exist when zakāt falls due. They also liken it to making the worker pay the zakāt of the principal itself, which is unanimously forbidden.
Ibn al-Qāsim replies that the obligation returns to a known percentage, even if the exact amount is unknown. Zakāt is a fixed proportion of zakatable wealth; thus it is as though the investor stipulated one-third of the profit minus a quarter of a tenth, or one-half minus a quarter of a tenth, or one-fourth minus a quarter of a tenth—arrangements that are valid. It is unlike obligating the worker to pay the zakāt of the principal, for that sum is fixed in amount but not in percentage and could consume all the profit, nullifying the worker’s effort.
May the worker impose such a stipulation on the investor? Within the school there are two main opinions: one draws a distinction between the two parties; another allows the worker to stipulate it against the investor but not vice-versa; a third view reverses that.
They also disagreed about the worker’s stipulating a particular slave, with the understanding that the slave receive a share of the profit. Mālik, al-Shāfiʿī, and Abū Ḥanīfah allowed it, while Ashhab—one of Mālik’s companions—did not. Those who permit it liken the matter to a man who entrusts someone with a qirāḍ