The third opinion is that of Mālik:
The buyer is at liberty either to keep the article, in which case the seller must reduce the price by the amount of the defect, or to return it to the seller and himself pay the seller the value of the defect that arose while the article was in his possession.

If seller and buyer dispute—so the seller says to the buyer, “I will take back the goods and you must pay the value of the defect that occurred while they were with you,” whereas the buyer says, “Rather, I will keep the goods and you must pay the value of the defect that arose while they were with you”—then the buyer’s word is accepted and the choice is his. A report within the school states instead that the seller’s word prevails, but that is only consistent with the view that the buyer’s alternatives are limited to keeping the article or returning it along with whatever diminution occurred while it was in his hands.

Abū Muḥammad Ibn Ḥazm diverged and held that the buyer may return the goods without owing anything.

Those who maintain that the buyer has only two options—either to return the article and pay the value of the defect or to keep it—argue that there is consensus that when no new defect appears in the buyer’s possession the only remedy is rescission; therefore that ruling must continue to apply even when a defect does occur, provided the buyer compensates for it.

Those who say that he need compensate only for the defect that existed while the article was with the seller draw an analogy with manumission and death, an analogy that is itself disputed; ʿAtāʾ dissented from it.

Mālik, confronted with a clash between the rights of seller and buyer, favored the buyer and granted him the option. For the seller is in one of two situations: either he was negligent, failing to investigate a defect the buyer later discovered, or he knew of the defect and deliberately concealed it. In Mālik’s view, if deliberate concealment is proven the seller must accept rescission without taking from the buyer any compensation for a defect that arose while the goods were with him; and if the article perishes because of that defect, the loss is borne by the seller—unlike the case in which no deception is established.

Abū Muḥammad’s argument is that the new defect is an act of God, just as if it had occurred while the goods were still the seller’s property. Rescission on account of defect shows that the sale was never sound in substance, only in outward form. Moreover, neither Qurʾān nor Sunnah obliges anyone to pay for a loss to which he did not contribute, except as a form of strict liability according to those who hold a usurper answerable for damage caused by an act of God. Such is the ruling for defects that befall the body of the property.

As for defects of disposition—absconding, theft, and the like—one report within the school says they bar rescission just as bodily defects do, while another denies that. There is, however, no disagreement that if a defect arising in the buyer’s possession subsequently disappears, it has no effect on the right of rescission unless its recurrence cannot safely be ruled out.

The jurists also differed regarding a buyer who has intercourse with a slave-girl. Some said that once he has slept with her he may not rescind, though he may recover the value of the defect, whether she was a virgin or previously deflowered; this is the view of Abū Ḥanīfah. Al-Shāfiʿī held that he must pay the value of the intercourse in the case of a virgin but not in that of a non-virgin. Others said that he may rescind and must in addition pay a dower equivalent; this was the opinion of Ibn Abī Shubrumah and Ibn Abī Laylā. Sufyān al-Thawrī ruled that if she was non-virgin he must pay one-twentieth of her price, and if a virgin one-tenth. Mālik held that nothing is owed for intercourse with a non-virgin, for the benefit is regarded as revenue that accrued to him in consideration of his liability.