is, in their estimation, better than simply preferring one ḥadīth over another. The later Mālikīs have offered closely related refinements on the issue; among those who do so are my grandfather, al-Māzarī, and al-Bājī. My grandfather’s detailed exposition runs as follows:

A condition attached to the object of sale falls, at the outset, into two main categories.

1. The first is that the seller stipulates something to take effect after ownership has passed—for example, a man sells a male or female slave and stipulates that, once the slave is emancipated, the walāʾ (right of allegiance) shall belong to him rather than to the purchaser. In such a case, they say, the contract itself is valid but the condition is void, in accordance with the ḥadīth of Barīrah.

2. The second category is that the condition is meant to operate during the period of ownership. This, they say, is subdivided into three types:

a) The seller stipulates for himself some benefit arising from the sold item;
b) he stipulates that the buyer be barred from some general or specific form of disposal; or
c) he stipulates that a certain consequence be effected in the thing sold.

The last of these (c) is itself divided into two sub-types: one in which the consequence is an act of righteousness (birr) and another in which it is not.

• If the seller stipulates for himself a minor benefit that does not deprive the buyer of disposing of the asset—such as selling a house while stipulating that he may live in it for a short period, say a month (some say as long as a year)—this is permissible on the strength of the ḥadīth of Jābir.

• If he stipulates that the buyer be prevented from a particular or general act of disposal, this is impermissible because it falls under thunyā; an example would be selling a slave girl on the condition that the buyer neither has intercourse with her nor sells her.

• If he stipulates a righteous consequence such as emancipation, then, provided the emancipation is to be carried out immediately, the sale is valid in Mālik’s view; but if it is postponed, it is invalid owing to the excessive gharar involved. Because Mālik allows a sale conditioned on immediate emancipation, al-Shāfiʿī understood that Mālik nevertheless prohibits a sale accompanied by (other) conditions. Al-Shāfiʿī also regarded the ḥadīth of Jābir as textually inconsistent, for some versions read: “He sold it and stipulated that he might ride it back to Madinah,” whereas others state: “He lent him its back until they reached Madinah.” Mālik considered this a case of slight gharar: he allowed it for a short period but not for a lengthy one. Abū Ḥanīfah, for his part, maintained his foundational ruling that such a condition is forbidden.

• If the stipulated consequence is not an act of righteousness—such as stipulating that the buyer must not resell the slave girl—then, according to Mālik, it is impermissible. Some report that the entire sale is thereby annulled; others say only the condition is void.

As for a seller who says to the buyer, “Whenever I bring you the price, you must return the merchandise to me,” Mālik deems this impermissible because the transaction vacillates between a sale and a loan: should he bring the price, it becomes a loan; if he does not, it remains a sale.

There is also disagreement within the school over whether such a stipulation is admissible in an iqālah (mutual rescission). Whoever regards the iqālah as a new sale annuls it by the same criteria that invalidate other sales, whereas whoever considers it a mere cancellation distinguishes it from sales.

There is further disagreement about someone who sells an item on the condition that the buyer not resell it until half the price has been paid. One report from Mālik permits this because its ruling is analogous to that of a pledge (rahn).