As for the report of Umm Ḥabībah—when she asked for perfume and passed it over her cheeks, then said, “By Allah, I have no wish for it except that I heard the Messenger of Allah, peace and blessings be upon him, say: ‘It is not lawful for a believing woman who believes in Allah and the Last Day to mourn for a deceased person more than three nights, except for a husband: four months and ten days’”—this ḥadīth does not furnish binding evidence, for it is an exception carved out from a prohibition and therefore establishes permissibility, not obligation. The same assessment applies to the ḥadīth of Zaynab bint Jaḥsh.

The Qāḍī said: When a command is issued after a prohibition, the theologians differ over whether it entails obligation or mere permissibility.

Those who obligate mourning seclusion for Muslim women but not for non-Muslims diverge for the following reason: whoever views iḥdād as an act of worship will not impose it on a non-Muslim woman; whoever regards it as a rationally discernible measure—namely, preventing men from seeking her out and her from seeking them—treats Muslim and non-Muslim alike; and whoever looked only to men’s attraction and not to women’s differentiated between the minor and the adult, provided the minor is not an object of men’s desire.

Among the proofs cited by those who make it binding on Muslim women but not on others is his, peace and blessings be upon him, saying: “It is not lawful for a woman who believes in Allah and the Last Day to observe mourning except for her husband.” They argue that stipulating faith as a condition shows that iḥdād is an act of worship.

As for those who distinguish between the slave-girl and the free woman—likewise between the woman of the Book and the Muslim woman—they contend that the waiting period occasioned by death imposes two matters by consensus: first, mourning seclusion; second, remaining indoors. Since the requirement to stay indoors is waived for a slave-girl owing to the need for her labor, the ban on adornment is likewise lifted from her. Their disagreement over the mukātaba stems from her intermediate status between freedom and slavery. Regarding the slave-girl held in outright ownership and the umm walad, the majority dropped the obligation of iḥdād for her on the strength of his, peace and blessings be upon him, statement: “It is not lawful for a woman who believes in Allah and the Last Day to mourn except for her husband,” from which it is understood by implication that anyone other than the wife is not bound to observe mourning seclusion.

Whoever obligates it for the widow but not for the divorced woman relies on the explicit wording, whereas the one who joins divorced women to widows does so by way of underlying meaning, because it appears from the very concept of iḥdād that