Mālik expressed two different opinions regarding the period of istibrāʾ: on one occasion he required three menstrual cycles, and on another only one.

As for an unqualified denial of pregnancy, the well-known position attributed to Mālik is that such a denial does not oblige liʿān. Al-Shāfiʿī, Aḥmad, and Dāwūd dissented, saying, “This has no substance, for a woman may conceive even while menstrual blood is seen.” ʿAbd al-Wahhāb reports from the Shāfiʿī jurists that pregnancy may not be disclaimed at all unless it is accompanied by an accusation of adultery.

They further disagreed on the issue of timing. The majority say the husband must repudiate the pregnancy while his wife is pregnant. Mālik stipulates that if he fails to do so during the pregnancy, it is not lawful for him to deny the child after delivery through liʿān. Al-Shāfiʿī likewise rules that once the husband knows of the pregnancy and the judge enables him to perform liʿān, yet he refrains, he may not deny the child once it is born. Abū Ḥanīfah, by contrast, holds that repudiation is not made until the woman has given birth.

Mālik and those who follow him rely on the mass-transmitted narrations from Ibn ʿAbbās, Ibn Masʿūd, Anas, and Sahl ibn Saʿd, in which the Prophet—peace and blessings be upon him—when judging between two spouses by liʿān said: “If she gives birth to a child with such-and-such features, I see him as having spoken the truth against her.” They reason that this shows the woman was already pregnant at the time of the liʿān.

Abū Ḥanīfah argues that a pregnancy can appear, then recede; hence liʿān should not be invoked except with certainty. The majority respond that the Sacred Law links numerous rulings to the mere appearance of pregnancy—maintenance, waiting period, prohibition of intercourse—so liʿān should follow the same principle.

Abū Ḥanīfah therefore allows liʿān even if the husband does not disclaim the pregnancy until the moment of birth, or shortly before, and he sets no specific limit. His two companions, Abū Yūsuf and Muḥammad, give him forty nights from the delivery to do so.

Those who require liʿān during pregnancy agree that the denial may be made while the marriage bond persists, but differ concerning denial after divorce. Mālik holds that it remains permissible throughout the entire period in which the child could ordinarily be attributed to the marital bed—that is, the maximum gestation in his view, roughly four, or even five, years—and he applies the same rule after divorce so long as the husband has continuously maintained his denial. Al-Shāfiʿī voices a view close to this.

Some scholars, however, say the husband may deny the pregnancy only during the waiting period (ʿiddah); should he do so outside that period, he incurs the hadd and the child is attached to him. According to the majority, the right of denial continues until the expiry of the longest possible gestation, though they differ as to its length. The Ẓāhirīs contend that the minimal term that establishes legal attribution is the customary period—nine months or thereabouts. All agree that judgment is binding during the subsistence of the marriage. Anything longer than the minimum gestation—six months (i.e., a child born six months after consummation or the possibility thereof, not from the date of contract)—is disputed.

Abū Ḥanīfah alone diverged, saying that the time is calculated from the date of the marriage contract, even when it is known that consummation was impossible until