the figurative sense, for one word cannot at the same time convey both its literal and its figurative signification.

I respond: Those who argue that a homonymous term possesses a general scope could well maintain that, in their view, a single expression contains both meanings—the literal and the figurative—although such usage is unknown among the Arabs. For that reason the position is exceedingly weak, and were it proven that the Sacred Law employed a word in that fashion it would be acceptable. Moreover, since they liken ẓihār to ilāʾ, it must, according to them, be restricted to the genital act.

Section Five: Does ẓihār Renew with a New Marriage?

As for the repetition of ẓihār after a divorce—namely, when a man divorces his wife after declaring ẓihār, before making the expiation, and then takes her back—does the earlier ẓihār revive so that intercourse remains forbidden until he expiates? On this point the jurists disagree.

• Mālik said: If he divorces her with fewer than three pronouncements and then resumes the marriage during the waiting period or after it, the expiation is still due.

• Al-Shāfiʿī held: If he takes her back during the waiting period, the expiation is obligatory; if he remarries her after the waiting period has ended, no expiation is required. A second opinion from him coincides with Mālik’s.

• Muḥammad ibn al-Ḥasan maintained that the ẓihār reattaches to her whether he marries her after a triple divorce or after a single one. The problem resembles that of a man who swears an oath of divorce, then actually divorces and later resumes the marriage: does the original oath remain binding or not?

The root of the disagreement is whether divorce abolishes all the rulings of marriage and demolishes them, or not. Some hold that only an irrevocable divorce—the triple pronouncement—demolishes the bond, whereas fewer than three pronouncements do not. Others contend that no form of divorce is demolishing, while, as I surmise, certain Ẓāhirīs regard every divorce as demolishing.

Section Six: The Interplay of Ilāʾ with ẓihār

Does ilāʾ take effect alongside ẓihār when the husband is acting harmfully—that is, when he refuses to expiate although able to do so? Here, too, opinions diverge:

• Abū Ḥanīfah and al-Shāfiʿī say the two rulings do not combine, because the legal consequences of ẓihār differ from those of ilāʾ, whether or not harm is intended. Al-Awzāʿī, Aḥmad, and a number of others agree.

• Mālik holds that ilāʾ does attach to ẓihār, provided the husband’s aim is to cause harm.

• Al-Thawrī contends that ilāʾ attaches to ẓihār and that the wife becomes separated from him at the lapse of four months, without considering whether harm was intended.

Accordingly, three positions emerge: (1) ilāʾ always enters; (2) it never enters; (3) it enters only when harm is intended. The dispute turns on whether one gives priority to outward wording or to underlying purpose: whoever looks to the wording says the two rulings do not intersect, whereas whoever considers the purpose says they do intersect when the intent is to harm.

Section Seven: Rulings Concerning the Expiation for ẓihār

The study of the expiation for ẓihār involves several matters: the number and order of its forms; the conditions that validate each form; and when a single expiation is required and when more than one becomes obligatory.

As for its forms, the jurists unanimously agree that they are three: emancipating a slave, fasting two consecutive months, or feeding sixty—