among the permanently prohibited women, whether one mentions the back or any other limb. Nonetheless, the plain wording of the Law indicates that a statement is not called ẓihār unless it contains both the words “back” and “mother.”
If, however, a man says, “She is to me like my mother,” without mentioning the back, Abū Ḥanīfah and al-Shāfiʿī hold that the ruling depends on what he intended, for he may only have wished to honor her and acknowledge her high status with him. Mālik, by contrast, rules that such a statement constitutes ẓihār.
Similarly, when a man likens his wife to an unrelated woman who is not permanently forbidden to him, Mālik still counts this as ẓihār, whereas Ibn al-Mājishūn does not. The point of contention is whether likening one’s wife to a woman whose prohibition is temporary is equivalent to likening her to one who is permanently prohibited.
Chapter Two
Conditions That Render the Expiation of Ẓihār Obligatory
As for these conditions, the majority of jurists say that expiation is not due unless the husband “returns,” while Mujāhid and Ṭāwūs—departing from the majority—maintain that it is obligatory even without any return. The majority cite as proof the Almighty’s words:
“Those who pronounce ẓihār regarding their wives and then return to what they have said must free a slave” (al-Mujādilah 58:3).
This verse explicitly links the obligation of expiation to the return. By analogy as well, ẓihār resembles the expiation for breaking an oath: just as that expiation is incurred only when one persists in—or intends to violate—the oath, so too with ẓihār.
Mujāhid and Ṭāwūs argue that ẓihār is an act that requires the gravest kind of expiation; therefore it should incur that penalty by its very utterance, without any additional factor, in the same way as the expiation for manslaughter or for deliberately breaking the fast. They add that ẓihār functioned as a form of divorce in pre-Islamic times, and that its prohibition was abrogated in Islam by prescribing expiation; this, they contend, is the meaning of His words, “then they return to what they said,” where “return” in their view means remaining in the marriage under Islam.
Those who stipulate a return before expiation becomes obligatory differ about what constitutes that return. Three reports are related from Mālik:
- Return means resolving both to keep the wife and to have intercourse with her.
- Return is merely the intention to have intercourse; this is the sound, well-known report from his companions and is likewise the position of Abū Ḥanīfah and Aḥmad.
- Return is the actual act of intercourse itself, though this is the weakest of the three reports among his followers.
Al-Shāfiʿī says that return is simply keeping the wife. He explains: “If enough time passes during which he could have divorced her but did not, this proves that he has returned and must offer the expiation, for his remaining with her at a time when divorce was possible yet not taken serves in place of—or at least indicates—his intention to keep her.”
Dāwūd and the Ẓāhirī scholars hold that return consists in repeating the wording of ẓihār a second time; if he does not do so, he is not deemed to have returned and no expiation is required.
The evidence for Mālik’s well-known report rests on two fundamental principles: