the time already elapsed is disregarded, and a new period of ʿīlāʾ begins from the moment he revokes the divorce—that is, the four-month term is calculated from the time of his return. If, however, the ʿīlāʾ is not deemed to have recommenced, it is not counted at all, except according to those who allow ʿīlāʾ without an oath. In either case, four full months must be reckoned from the point of revocation.

Mālik, for his part, maintained that any revocation of a divorce issued to remove harm is valid only when that harm has actually been lifted. The paradigm is the husband who was divorced for failing to provide maintenance: should he take his wife back, the soundness of that return depends on his having become solvent.

The basis of the disagreement is an argument from resemblance. Whoever likens the revocation to the initiation of a new marriage requires the ʿīlāʾ to start afresh; whereas whoever likens this revocation to a husband’s return after a harm-based divorce, when the harm still persists, holds that the original ruling remains in force.