According to Abū Ḥanīfah, the statutory period for ʿīlāʾ is only four months, for in his view the husband’s “return” (fayʾ) must occur within that span. Al-Ḥasan and Ibn Abī Laylā, however, maintained that whenever a man swears off marital relations for any specified time—even less than four months—he is deemed a muʾlī; the court then grants him a respite that completes four full months calculated from the moment of the oath. A report from Ibn ʿAbbās states that a muʾlī is one who swears never again—permanently—to touch his wife.

Reason for the divergence over the time-limit
Their disagreement on duration goes back to the unrestricted wording of the Qur’ānic verse. Because the text is either general or laconic regarding (a) the deadline for resumption of relations, (b) the form and length of the oath, they differed on all these particulars, as well as on the very definition of the muʾlī, the wife affected, and the kind of divorce entailed—questions that will be taken up presently.

As for the remaining points, the source of their differences is simply the verse’s silence on them. These constitute the essential pillars of ʿīlāʾ—namely: knowing the type of oath, the time and length allotted for the husband’s return, the description of the wife concerned, and the kind of divorce that results.

Issue Five
What type of divorce is effected by ʿīlāʾ? Mālik and al-Shāfiʿī hold that it is a revocable divorce, for the default in every divorce established by the Sharīʿah is that it remains revocable unless evidence proves otherwise. Abū Ḥanīfah and Abū Thawr contend that it is an irrevocable (bāʾin) divorce, arguing that if it were revocable the wife’s harm would not be removed, since he could compel her to return. Thus the crux of the dispute is a clash between the Sharʿī default in divorce and the specific welfare sought by the law of ʿīlāʾ: whoever prioritizes the default rules it revocable, whereas whoever prioritizes the welfare declares it irrevocable.

Issue Six
If the husband refuses both to resume relations and to pronounce divorce, does the judge dissolve the marriage, or is the husband imprisoned until he divorces her himself? Mālik says the judge divorces on his behalf. The Ẓāhirī school says the husband is detained until he issues the divorce himself. The disagreement again pits the general rule that divorce issues only from the husband against the interest of protecting women from harm. Those who uphold the general rule say divorce cannot be effected except by the husband; those who give precedence to preventing harm allow the ruler to pronounce it, arguing from public interest (al-maṣlaḥah al-ʿāmmah). This is what is known as unrestricted analogy (qiyās mursal), and it is transmitted that Mālik acted on it, though many jurists reject the method.

Issue Seven
Does ʿīlāʾ recur if he divorces her and later takes her back? Mālik holds that if, after resumption, he still refrains from intercourse, a new case of ʿīlāʾ arises—whether the earlier divorce was revocable or irrevocable. Abū Ḥanīfah says an irrevocable divorce cancels ʿīlāʾ altogether; this is also one opinion of al-Shāfiʿī and the view preferred by al-Muzanī and a group of scholars, namely that ʿīlāʾ does not recur after a divorce unless the husband renews the oath. Here again the dispute turns on balancing welfare against the explicit condition of ʿīlāʾ: in Sharīʿah there is no ʿīlāʾ unless an oath exists within that very marriage, not a different one. Yet if the literal requirement is observed, the very harm that ʿīlāʾ is meant to remove persists. For this reason Mālik ruled that the legal consequences of ʿīlāʾ apply even without a new oath whenever its substantive meaning is found.