her first divorce—one of the two views narrated from al-Shāfiʿī.

Dāwūd held that she is neither required to complete the current waiting period nor to start a new one.

In brief, Mālik maintains that every revocation annuls the ʿiddah even if marital relations have not resumed, the sole exception being the revocation of a husband who has taken an oath of abstention (mūlī).

Al-Shāfiʿī, by contrast, says that if the husband pronounces a second divorce after having taken her back but before intercourse, she continues in her original ʿiddah—and al-Shāfiʿī’s position is the more persuasive.

Likewise, according to Mālik, the validity of the revocation issued by a husband who is unable to provide maintenance is contingent upon his actually spending: if he does so, the revocation stands and the ʿiddah is cancelled; if he fails to spend, she remains in her initial waiting period.

If, during her ʿiddah, she contracts another marriage, two opinions are related from Mālik: the first holds that the two waiting periods run concurrently, the second denies this.

The rationale of the first is that the purpose is merely to ensure that the womb is clear, something achieved even when the periods overlap.
The rationale of the second is that the ʿiddah is an act of worship; therefore it must be repeated for every protected act of intercourse.

Should a slave-woman be emancipated while still observing the ʿiddah of divorce, Mālik says she continues with the slave’s waiting period and does not move to that of a free woman.
Abū Ḥanīfah says she shifts in both cases.

The root of the disagreement is whether the ʿiddah belongs to the rulings of marriage itself or to those of its dissolution.
Whoever regards it as part of the laws of marriage says her waiting period does not change; whoever sees it as part of the laws of separation says it does change, just as it would if she were freed while still a wife and only then divorced.
As for those who distinguish between an irrevocable and a revocable divorce, the matter is clear: the revocable divorce retains some of the effects of the matrimonial bond—for example, inheritance is unanimously deemed to apply if the husband dies while she is in the ʿiddah of a revocable divorce, at which point her waiting period converts to that of widowhood.

This concludes the first of the two parts devoted to the study of ʿiddah.

[Part Two: The Legal Rulings of the Waiting Period]

As for the rulings themselves, the scholars agree that a woman in a revocable ʿiddah is entitled to maintenance and lodging, and the same applies to a pregnant woman, by virtue of the Almighty’s words concerning revocable divorcees:

“Lodge them where you dwell, according to your means” (al-Ṭalāq 65:6),

and His words:

“If they are pregnant, then maintain them until they deliver” (al-Ṭalāq 65:6).

They differed, however, about the housing and maintenance of a woman who has been irrevocably divorced and is not pregnant, holding three distinct views:

1. She is entitled to both housing and maintenance—this is the view of the Kufan jurists.
2. She is entitled to neither housing nor maintenance—this is the view of Aḥmad, Dāwūd, Abū Thawr, Isḥāq, and others.
3. She is entitled to housing but not maintenance—this is the view of Mālik, al-Shāfiʿī, and a number of scholars.

The cause of their divergence lies in the variant transmissions of the ḥadīth of Fāṭimah bint Qays and in the apparent sense of the Qur’ānic text that seems to conflict with it.
Thus those who deny both maintenance and housing cite the narration in which Fāṭimah bint Qays said: