any right over her; she now belongs to the man who married her. It has, however, been said that this report is transmitted only from Ibn Shihāb.

The first party marshal as proof the scholarly consensus that a revocation is valid even if the wife is unaware of it, for the jurists likewise agree that the first husband has the stronger claim to her so long as she has not yet entered a new marriage. If the revocation is valid, the second union is necessarily void, because a stranger’s marriage has no effect in nullifying a lawful revocation—whether consummation has taken place or not. This, God willing, is the stronger view, and it is supported by what al-Tirmidhī has narrated from Samurah ibn Jundub: the Prophet—peace and blessings be upon him—said,

“Any woman who is married by two men belongs to the first of them, and anyone who sells the same article to two purchasers, it belongs to the first of them.”

The Second Chapter
Rulings on Taking a Woman Back After an Irrevocable Divorce

An irrevocable divorce (ṭalāq bāʾin) is of two kinds. If it is less than three pronouncements, it unquestionably applies to a wife who has not yet been cohabited with, and—subject to disagreement—to a woman who has obtained khulʿ. Whether it may occur without compensation is also disputed. The legal consequences of taking her back after such a divorce are identical to those of initiating a new marriage—that is, the bridal-gift, the guardian, and the mutual consent are all required—save that, according to the majority, the expiry of the waiting-period is not a condition.

A small group dissented, saying that a woman who has taken khulʿ may not be married—whether by her former husband or by anyone else—during her waiting-period. These scholars appear to have regarded the ban on marriage during the waiting-period as an act of devotion in itself.

As for the woman made irrevocable by three divorces, all scholars hold that a thrice-divorced wife is not lawful for her first husband until she has had sexual intercourse with another husband. The proof is the ḥadīth of Rifāʿah ibn Samuʾel:

“He divorced his wife, Tamīmah bint Wahb, three times in the lifetime of the Messenger of Allah—peace and blessings be upon him. She subsequently married ʿAbd al-Raḥmān ibn al-Zubayr, but he was unable to approach her, so he left her. Rifāʿah, her first husband, wished to remarry her and mentioned this to the Messenger of Allah—peace be upon him—who forbade him, saying, ‘She is not lawful for you until she tastes the sweetness of intercourse.’”

Saʿīd ibn al-Musayyib held a lone opinion: he deemed it permissible for her to return to her first husband by means of a new contract alone, invoking the general wording of the verse, “until she marries another husband” (Q 2:230), for nikāḥ can denote the contract itself.

All the scholars, however, said that mere penetration—the meeting of the two circumcised parts—renders her lawful, except al-Ḥasan al-Baṣrī, who maintained that she is not lawful until intercourse accompanied by ejaculation takes place.

The majority further state that the act of intercourse which incurs the ḥadd penalty, invalidates the fast and the pilgrimage, renders the thrice-divorced woman lawful, confers the status of muḥṣan upon the spouses, and obliges the bridal-gift, is precisely this meeting of the two circumcised parts.

Mālik and Ibn al-Qāsim add that the thrice-divorced woman is not made lawful unless the intercourse itself is permissible—that is, it occurs within a valid marriage contract.