his wife solely to deprive her of her share of the estate.
Hence, those who apply the doctrine of “blocking the means” oblige that she inherit, whereas those who do not invoke that principle—and who instead regard the divorce as unquestionably effective—deny her any inheritance.

This latter party argues that, once the divorce has taken place, every one of its legal consequences must follow, for they say: he would not inherit from her were she to die. Conversely, if the divorce has not taken effect, the marital bond continues with all its rulings intact. Their opponents are therefore forced to choose one of these two alternatives, for it is difficult to claim that the Sacred Law recognizes a form of divorce that carries some of the rulings of divorce and some of the rulings of marriage. Still more difficult is to maintain a distinction based on whether the divorce will later be validated or not, for that would amount to a divorce whose legal force is suspended until its validity is determined—something very hard to affirm in the Law.

The only support its advocates can cite is that it was the fatwa of ʿUthmān and ʿUmar; the Mālikīs even asserted that it represents the consensus of the Companions, but their claim is baseless, for Ibn al-Zubayr’s dissent on the matter is well-known.

Those who hold that she inherits only while still in her waiting-period argue that the ʿidda retains certain rulings of marriage, likening her to a wife in a revocable divorce. This opinion is reported from ʿUmar and from ʿĀ’isha.

Others make her right to inherit dependent on her remaining unmarried, taking into account the unanimous agreement of Muslims that one woman may not inherit from two husbands simultaneously. Still, suspicion of foul intent remains the actual rationale for those who give her the inheritance.

The scholars further disagreed when it is she who seeks the divorce or when the husband delegates the matter to her and she divorces herself. Abū Ḥanīfah maintained that she inherits nothing at all. Al-Awzāʿī drew a distinction: she inherits nothing in the case of delegation, but does inherit when he himself pronounces the divorce. Mālik makes no such distinction; indeed he said: if she dies, he does not inherit her, whereas if he dies, she inherits him—a view sharply at odds with fundamental principles.

Chapter Three
Women whose divorce takes effect and those for whom it does not

The scholars agree that divorce takes effect with respect to wives who are presently under their husbands’ authority, or who are still within their waiting-period after a revocable divorce, and that it does not take effect with respect to unrelated women—that is, in the case of a conditional divorce.

As for making divorce contingent upon marrying an unrelated woman—such as a man’s saying, “If I marry So-and-so she is divorced”—the jurists hold three opinions:

1. Divorce cannot attach to an unrelated woman at all, whether the wording is general or specific; this is the view of al-Shāfiʿī, Aḥmad, Dāwūd, and a number of scholars.
2. Divorce can attach on condition of marriage, whether the statement is all-inclusive or restricted; this is the position of Abū Ḥanīfah and others.
3. If the man generalizes to all women the statement does not bind him, but if he specifies a particular group it does bind him. This is the doctrine of Mālik and his companions—for example, if a man says, “Every woman I marry from the clan of so-and-so, or from such-and-such a town, or at such-and-such a time, is divorced,” then, according to Mālik, such women are divorced the moment they are wed.

The root of the disagreement is whether a prior marital ownership must exist before the declaration of divorce for it to be valid. Whoever deems that a necessary condition says that divorce cannot attach to an unrelated woman; whoever holds that the only requirement is that the ownership exist at some point says that it can.