“…of error, forgetfulness, and what they have been compelled to do.”

Yet the stronger opinion holds that a man coerced into issuing a divorce, even though he utters the words of his own accord, is still deemed in the Law to be “coerced,” for the Exalted One says:

“except for him who is forced while his heart is tranquil in faith”
(Q 16:106).

Abū Ḥanīfah drew a distinction between a coerced sale and a coerced divorce because divorce is treated with particular gravity; hence a serious declaration and a jest are given identical legal weight.

Divorce pronounced by a minor

The widely transmitted view from Mālik is that it is not binding until the boy reaches puberty. In the work “Mukhtaṣar mā laysa fī al-Mukhtaṣar” he states that it becomes binding once the child nears sexual maturity, and Aḥmad ibn Ḥanbal concurred—provided the youth can endure the fast of Ramaḍān. ʿAṭāʾ said that once a boy reaches twelve, his divorce is valid; a similar report is related from ʿUmar ibn al-Khaṭṭāb, may Allah be pleased with him.

Divorce pronounced by one who is intoxicated

The majority of jurists hold that it takes effect. Others—among them al-Muzanī and some of Abū Ḥanīfah’s associates—say it does not. Their disagreement revolves around whether the drunkard’s legal status is identical to that of the insane, or whether the two differ.

Those who view them as equal—since both lack reason, and reason is a prerequisite for legal obligation—declare that the divorce does not occur. Those who differentiate argue that the drunkard corrupted his intellect by choice whereas the madman did not, and therefore bind the drunkard to the divorce as a punitive measure.

Jurists also disagree, in general, over which rulings do and do not bind the intoxicated person. Mālik obliges him with divorce, manumission, and retaliation for injury or homicide, yet not with marriage contracts or sales. Abū Ḥanīfah obliges him in every matter. Al-Layth held that every utterance of the drunkard is null: no divorce, manumission, marriage, sale, or ḥadd for slander; but whatever harm his limbs inflict remains chargeable to him, so he is punished for drinking, killing, fornication, and theft.

It is authentically reported from ʿUthmān ibn ʿAffān—may Allah be pleased with him—that he regarded the divorce of the drunkard as ineffective, and some scholars claim none of the Companions disagreed with him on this.

The statement of those who hold that every divorce is valid except the divorce of the mentally incompetent is no proof for binding the drunkard, for the drunkard is, after all, a kind of incompetent. This, too, is the view of Dāwūd, Abū Thawr, Isḥāq, and a group of the Successors—that his divorce is not binding. Two opinions are related from al-Shāfiʿī; most of his followers favor the one that concurs with the majority, whereas al-Muzanī opts for the view that the divorce does not take effect.

As for the terminally ill man who issues an irrevocable divorce and then dies from his illness, Mālik and a number of others say that his wife inherits from him, while al-Shāfiʿī and others deny her any inheritance.

Those who grant her the inheritance fall into three parties:

1. One group says she inherits as long as she is still in her waiting-period (ʿidda); among them are Abū Ḥanīfah, his companions, and al-Thawrī.
2. Another group says she inherits so long as she has not remarried; this is the position of Aḥmad and Ibn Abī Laylā.
3. A third group maintains that she inherits whether she is in the waiting-period or not, whether she remarries or does not; this is the doctrine of Mālik and al-Layth.

The root of the disagreement lies in their differing attitudes toward the principle of “blocking the means” (sadd al-dharaʿiʿ). Because a sick man is suspected of divorcing during his illness only so as to