As for a divorce qualified by an exception, this can arise only with respect to the number of repudiations. When a man pronounces several divorces, the matter does not escape three possibilities:

1. He may except that very same number, as when he says, “You are divorced three times—except three,” or “two—except two.”

2. He may except a different number. This in turn has two variants:
   a. He excludes a smaller number from a larger, as in: “You are divorced three times—except one.” Here, to the best of my knowledge, there is no disagreement that the exception is valid and the amount excepted is waived.
   b. He excludes a larger number from a smaller. On this there are two views:
   • Some say the exception is invalid, for they do not allow a larger amount to be excepted from a smaller.
   • Others—Mālik among them—hold that the exception is valid.

3. He may except the identical number he first pronounced, as in: “You are divorced three times—except three.” Mālik rules that the divorce takes effect, suspecting that the wording is merely a device to retract. If, however, no suspicion of retraction is raised and the husband’s aim is to render the divorce impossible, then no divorce occurs—just as if he said, “You are divorced and not divorced at the same time,” for the simultaneous occurrence of a thing and its opposite is impossible.

Abū Muḥammad Ibn Ḥazm held a solitary opinion, contending that no divorce can be effected by a future description or an act not yet performed. Divorce, he argues, is valid only at the moment the husband personally utters it, and there is no evidence from Qur’an, Sunnah, or consensus for a divorce coming into force at a time when the husband did not actually pronounce it. What the husband has done is merely obligate himself to pronounce it in the future; and if we deem that obligation binding, consistency would require us to wait until that moment so that he may pronounce it. Such, in my view, is the logical outcome and proof of his position, though I do not at present recall the specific argument he offered.

[Chapter Two: The Husband Legally Competent to Divorce]

The jurists agree that this is a rational, adult, free husband who is not acting under coercion. They disagree, however, about the divorce of one who is coerced, intoxicated, mortally ill, or on the verge of puberty. They concur that the divorce of an ill man who later recovers is effective, but they differ as to whether the wife inherits from him should he die.

As for the divorce of a coerced husband, it does not take effect according to Mālik, al-Shāfiʿī, Aḥmad, Dāwūd, and a number of others; the same view is reported from ʿAbd Allāh ibn ʿUmar, Ibn al-Zubayr, ʿUmar ibn al-Khaṭṭāb, ʿAlī ibn Abī Ṭālib, and Ibn ʿAbbās. The Shāfiʿīs distinguish between one who intended the divorce and one who formed no intention. If he intended it, they record two opinions, the sounder being that it is binding; if he had no such intention, they also transmit two opinions, the sounder being that it is not binding.

Abū Ḥanīfah and his companions maintain that such a divorce is effective, as is a coerced manumission, though not a coerced sale; thus they differentiate between sale on the one hand and divorce or emancipation on the other.

The crux of the dispute lies in whether a person who utters the formula under duress is truly acting by choice, for no one is forced to articulate the words themselves—utterance always proceeds from volition. Genuine coercion, they say, exists only when a person is devoid of all choice in bringing about the act. Each side supports its position with the ḥadīth: “My community has been absolved …”