As for a condition whose fulfillment is inevitable—such as the rising of the sun tomorrow—Mālik holds that the divorce takes effect immediately, whereas al-Shāfiʿī and Abū Ḥanīfah suspend its effectiveness until the condition actually occurs.
Whoever treats this case like any other condition that may or may not materialize says: the divorce does not take place unless the condition is fulfilled.
By contrast, whoever likens it to intercourse that must occur within the fixed term of a temporary marriage—intercourse that is lawful only up to that deadline—rules that the divorce takes effect at once.
A third category comprises conditions that, by common experience, are very likely to happen yet still might not—such as making the divorce contingent on childbirth, menstruation, or attaining purity. About this there are two reports from Mālik. One states that the divorce becomes operative immediately; the other—agreeing with Abū Ḥanīfah and al-Shāfiʿī—holds that it remains in suspense until the condition appears. The first report is weaker, for Mālik there treated the case as though the event were certain, and the disagreement in this matter is pronounced.
Turning to conditional divorce based on an occurrence whose existence is unknown: if the occurrence can never be ascertained—say, a man says, “If today Allah has created in the Red Sea a fish of such-and-such description, you are divorced”—then, in the Mālikī school, the divorce unquestionably takes place.
If the condition can later be verified—such as saying, “If you give birth to a daughter, you are divorced”—the divorce is suspended until that event actually happens.
Should the husband swear by divorce that she will indeed give birth to a daughter, Mālik nonetheless deems the divorce to have fallen immediately, treating the oath as a form of stern emphasis; strict analogy would require suspending the divorce until the birth of the child, whether male or female.
Mālik further states: if a man binds divorce to his carrying out a certain act, he is not considered perjured until he does that act; but if he binds it to his refraining from a particular act, he is deemed perjured until he performs it. During that time he is barred from marital relations. Should his abstention exceed the four-month period fixed for ʿīlāʾ, the court grants him that very deadline; yet, according to Mālik, the divorce will not fall until the time for performing the act has irretrievably lapsed, provided the act is one that can lapse. Some scholars say he remains in obedience until the act becomes impossible, and if it can never become impossible, he remains obedient until death.
This discussion also gives rise to their disagreement over (1) divorcing only part of the wife, (2) partial divorces, and (3) appending one divorce to another.
Concerning partial divorce of the woman herself: Mālik rules that if a man says, “Your hand is divorced,” or “Your foot,” or “Your hair,” the divorce is effected. Abū Ḥanīfah holds that divorce is valid only when he mentions a limb that can stand for the whole body—such as the head, the heart, or the private parts—and the same applies if he divorces a fractional share of her, such as one-third or one-quarter. Dāwūd maintains that no divorce takes place at all.
Similarly, according to Mālik, if a man says, “I divorce you half a divorce,” the divorce is effected, because in his view divorce cannot be divided. The opposing jurists say that a fractional formulation yields no divorce.
If a man says to an unconsummated wife, “You are divorced, you are divorced, you are divorced,” repeating the phrase consecutively, Mālik counts this as three divorces. Abū Ḥanīfah and al-Shāfiʿī count it as one. Those who liken the repeated wording to explicitly stating the number—as in, “I divorce you three times”—declare that three divorces occur; those who view the first utterance as already severing the bond hold that the second and third have no effect. All Muslims, however, agree that in the case of a revocable divorce, successive utterances are legally effective.