he held that it is a revocable divorce, basing himself on the aforementioned ḥadīth of Rukānah.

Abū Ḥanīfah, by contrast, judges it to be an irrevocable separation, for the very aim of such wording, in his view, is to sever the marital bond. Yet he does not count it as three divorces, because “three” adds something over and above simple irrevocability.

The crux of their disagreement is this: should priority be given to customary usage of the words, or to the speaker’s intention? If customary usage is given precedence, does that usage denote mere irrevocability, or does it also imply a specific number of divorces? Whoever prefers intention does not rule according to linguistic usage, whereas whoever prefers outward usage pays no heed to intention.

Among the issues of this sort over which the first generation and the jurists of the various regions differed is the formula of taḥrīm—that is, when a man says to his wife, “You are forbidden to me.” Mālik maintained that, if the marriage has been consummated, such a statement is to be construed as a final, definitive separation—namely, three divorces—whereas in an unconsummated marriage it turns on the husband’s intention. This squares with his earlier principle concerning manifest allusions. The same position is reported from Ibn Abī Laylā and from the Companions Zayd ibn Thābit and ʿAlī. Mālik’s followers concurred, with the exception of Ibn al-Mājishūn, who held that even in an unconsummated marriage no intention is considered and the statement amounts to three divorces. This constitutes the first opinion on the question.

The second opinion is that if the husband intends three divorces, then three take effect; if he intends one, it is a single irrevocable divorce; if he intends it as an oath, it is an oath requiring expiation; and if he intends neither divorce nor an oath, it counts for nothing—merely an empty utterance. This is the view of Sufyān al-Thawrī.

The third opinion likewise makes the ruling follow intention: one divorce if one is intended, three if three are intended, and, if no intention is formed, the words amount to an oath that must be expiated. This is the position of al-Awzāʿī.

The fourth opinion holds that intention is considered at two levels—whether divorce is meant at all and, if so, how many. Whatever the husband intends is what comes into force: if he intends one divorce, it is a single revocable divorce; and if he means only to prohibit his wife without divorcing her, he must pay the expiation for an oath. This is the view of al-Shāfiʿī.

The fifth opinion, attributed to Abū Ḥanīfah and his colleagues, also looks to intention as to divorce and number: if he intends one divorce, it is a single irrevocable divorce; if no divorce is intended, the statement becomes an oath and he falls under the ruling of īlāʾ (vowing to abstain from marital relations); and if he merely meant to lie, nothing results.

The sixth opinion is that the utterance is an oath, expiable by the usual kaffārah for oaths—though some hold it to be a solemn, aggravated oath. This is reported from ʿUmar, Ibn Masʿūd, Ibn ʿAbbās, and a group of the Successors.

When Ibn ʿAbbās was asked about the matter, he recited: “Indeed in the Messenger of Allah you have a good example” (Qurʾān 33:21), a report transmitted by al-Bukhārī and Muslim. He thus argued by the Almighty’s words: “O Prophet, why do you forbid what Allah has made lawful for you” (Qurʾān 66:1).