the matter becomes prolonged, according to one narration, or they rise from the session; another narration says that her empowerment remains in force until she either retracts it or declares the divorce.
In Mālik’s view, the difference between tamlīk and appointing the wife as an agent to divorce herself is that, in agency, the husband may revoke her mandate before she pronounces the divorce, whereas in tamlīk he enjoys no such right.
Al-Shāfiʿī states that the phrases, “Choose [for yourself]” and “Your affair is in your own hand,” are equivalent, and that they do not amount to divorce unless he intends it. If he does intend divorce, the outcome corresponds to his intention: if one pronouncement, then one; if three, then three. According to him, the husband may contest with her both the fact of divorce itself and the number of pronouncements when the wording is one of choice or empowerment; and if she divorces herself, the divorce is revocable. Mālik holds the same with respect to tamlīk.
Abū Ḥanīfah and his colleagues maintain that mere choice is not divorce, but if, under tamlīk, she pronounces one divorce it is irrevocable.
Al-Thawrī considers choice and tamlīk identical, with no distinction between them.
Some have said that, in tamlīk, the wife’s word is accepted regarding the number of divorces and the husband may not dispute her. This opinion is reported from ʿAlī and Saʿīd ibn al-Musayyab and is endorsed by al-Zuhrī and ʿAṭāʾ.
Another view holds that a woman empowered by tamlīk may issue only a single divorce; this is reported from Ibn ʿAbbās and ʿUmar—may Allah be pleased with them both.
It is related that a man came to Ibn Masʿūd and said, “Something happened between me and my wife, and she said, ‘If the affair of mine that is in your hand were in mine, I would know what to do.’ I replied, ‘Then the affair of yours that is in my hand is now in your hand.’ She declared, ‘Then you are divorced thrice.’” Ibn Masʿūd said, “I count it as one divorce, and you have a better right to her as long as she is in her waiting-period. I shall consult the Commander of the Believers, ʿUmar.” He then met ʿUmar and told him the story. ʿUmar said, “God has dealt with men as He has: they take what Allah has placed in their hands and put it in women’s hands—may dust fill their mouths! What did you decide?” Ibn Masʿūd replied, “I counted it as one divorce and held that he had the better right to her.” ʿUmar said, “That is my judgment as well; had you ruled otherwise I would have known you were mistaken.”
Others argue that tamlīk carries no legal weight at all, for what the Law has vested in the husband cannot be reassigned to the wife by human arrangement; they say the same of choice. This is the position of Abū Muḥammad Ibn Ḥazm.
According to Mālik, a wife who has been empowered retains the option either to divorce or to remain in the marriage as long as the two spouses are still in the same session; this is also the view of al-Shāfiʿī, Abū Ḥanīfah, al-Awzāʿī, and a number of jurists of the major towns. Al-Shāfiʿī further holds that tamlīk, if intended as a means to divorce, resembles agency: the husband may revoke it whenever he wishes, provided the divorce has not yet been effected.
The majority accepted the validity of tamlīk and choice and allowed them for women because it is authentically reported that the Messenger of Allah—peace and blessings be upon him—offered his wives the option. ʿĀʾishah said, “The Messenger of Allah—peace and blessings be upon him—gave us the choice, and we chose him,” and that was not deemed a divorce. The Literalists, however, maintain that the meaning is that, had the wives chosen themselves, the Messenger of Allah—peace and blessings be upon him—would then have divorced them, not that their mere act of choosing would itself have effected a divorce.