whereas whoever does not view it that way holds that no additional divorce is attached.

Among the consequential rulings:
The overwhelming majority of scholars are agreed that the husband has no right of revocation (rajʿah) over a wife who has obtained a khulʿ during her ʿiddah, except for the report from Saʿīd ibn al-Musayyab and Ibn Shihāb (al-Zuhrī), who both said: “If, while she is still in her waiting period, he returns to her the compensation he took and calls witnesses to his revocation, the revocation is effective.” This ties in with the distinction we cited from Abū Thawr as to whether or not the explicit word “divorce” is used.

Another ruling:
The majority likewise concur that he may marry her anew, with her consent, even while she is in her ʿiddah; a group of later jurists, however, maintained that neither he nor anyone else may marry her during that period.

The root of their disagreement is whether the ban on marriage during the waiting period is an act of pure worship, or a prohibition grounded in a discernible rationale. They also disagreed over the length of the ʿiddah for a woman who has undergone khulʿ; this will be discussed later.

They further differed when the husband and wife dispute the number of divorces by which the khulʿ was concluded. Mālik says that, in the absence of proof, the husband’s word is accepted. Al-Shāfiʿī holds that they should take mutual oaths, after which she is liable for a dower equivalent to that customary for a woman of her standing; he likens their dispute to one arising between two parties to a sale. Mālik also states that in such a case she is the defendant and he the claimant. The issues belonging to this chapter are many and lie beyond our present purpose.

Chapter Four
Distinguishing Divorce from Annulment (fasḵ)
Mālik—may Allah have mercy on him—expressed two opinions about the difference between a separation that does not count toward the three allowable divorces and one that does.

First opinion: If the marriage itself is subject to a well-known disagreement outside his own school as to its validity—for example, a woman marrying herself off, or a person in iḥrām contracting marriage—then the separation in such a case is treated as a divorce, not an annulment.

Second opinion: What matters is the cause that necessitates the separation. If that cause lies outside the spouses—such that, even if they wished to remain married, their union could not lawfully continue—the separation is an annulment, as in a marriage prohibited by suckling or one contracted during the ʿiddah. If, however, the cause is something over which they could choose to remain together, such as rescission on account of a defect, then it is a divorce.

Chapter Five
On Takhyīr (Choice) and Tamlīk (Empowerment)
Among the forms of divorce that carry special rulings are tamlīk and takhyīr. According to Mālik’s well-known position, tamlīk differs from takhyīr. Tamlīk is the husband’s granting the wife authority to pronounce the divorce; it may result in a single pronouncement or more, and he may dispute with her over anything beyond the first. Takhyīr is different, for it necessarily entails a divorce that terminates the marital bond—unless the choice is limited, as when he says, “Choose yourself,” or “Choose one or two divorces.”

Thus, in unrestricted takhyīr, Mālik holds that the wife has only two options: either remain with her husband or separate from him with three pronouncements; if she elects a single divorce, she has no such option. As for a wife who has been given tamlīk, her empowerment is not nullified, in Mālik’s view, if she has not yet pronounced the divorce until