or with less than that.

Some scholars, however, maintained that the husband may not take back more than he originally gave her, basing themselves on the outward sense of the ḥadīth of Thābit. Those who likened the payment in khulʿ to all other forms of consideration in commercial transactions judged that its amount is left to mutual consent, while those who adhered strictly to the ḥadīth did not allow anything in excess of that, viewing such excess as the unlawful appropriation of wealth.

Issue Two: The nature of the consideration
Al-Shāfiʿī and Abū Ḥanīfah stipulate that the consideration must be precisely defined in kind and definitively due. Mālik, on the other hand, allows it to be something whose existence or quantity is unknown, or even something not yet in existence—such as a runaway or stray slave, fruit that has not yet begun to ripen, or an undescribed slave. It is also reported from Abū Ḥanīfah that he permits uncertain (gharar) property but disallows that which is non-existent.

The root of the disagreement is whether the consideration here is to be treated like the price in a sale, or like property that is gifted or bequeathed. Whoever likens it to a sale imposes the same conditions required in sales and their counter-payments; whoever likens it to gifts does not impose those conditions.

They also differed when khulʿ is concluded for something impermissible—such as wine or pork—over whether the wife owes any compensation, even though they all agree that the divorce takes effect. Mālik ruled that she is entitled to no compensation, and the same was said by Abū Ḥanīfah. Al-Shāfiʿī maintained that she is entitled to a dower equivalent to that customarily given to women of her standing (mahr al-mithl).

Issue Three: Circumstances in which khulʿ is permissible
As for the circumstances that make khulʿ permissible or impermissible, the majority hold that it is lawful by mutual consent, provided that the wife’s willingness to pay is not the result of harm inflicted on her. The basis is the Almighty’s words:
“Do not prevent them so as to take back part of what you have given them, unless they commit a clear indecency” (al-Nisāʾ 4:19),
and His words,
“If you fear that the two of them may not uphold the limits set by Allah, there is no blame on either of them regarding what she gives up to ransom herself” (al-Baqarah 2:229).

Abū Qilābah and al-Ḥasan al-Baṣrī dissented, asserting that a man may not accept khulʿ from his wife unless he actually sees her commit adultery; they interpreted “clear indecency” in the verse as fornication. Dāwūd (al-Ẓāhirī) held that khulʿ is permissible only when the condition of fearing that the couple will not maintain Allah’s limits is met, in line with the explicit wording of the verse. Nuʿmān (Abū Ḥanīfah), in an isolated opinion, allowed khulʿ even when harm is present.

The juristic rationale is that the ransom was instituted for the wife as a counterpart to the husband’s exclusive right of divorce: since divorce was placed in the husband’s hand when he becomes averse to his wife, khulʿ was placed in the wife’s hand when she becomes averse to her husband.

From this emerge five positions regarding khulʿ:

1. that it is never permissible;
2. that it is permissible in all circumstances—even when harm is involved;
3. that it is permissible only upon witnessing adultery;
4. that it is permissible when there is fear that the couple will not uphold Allah’s limits; and
5. that it is permissible in every case except where harm is inflicted, and this is the well-known view.

Issue Four: Who may and who may not effect khulʿ
There is no disagreement among the majority that a competent, adult woman may conclude khulʿ on her own behalf, whereas a slave-woman may not do so without her master’s consent; likewise, a woman lacking full financial competence may only do so with her guardian, according to those who uphold legal restriction (ḥajr). Mālik said that a father may contract khulʿ on behalf of his minor daughter just as he may contract her marriage, and likewise on behalf of his minor son, for in his view he may pronounce divorce on the child’s behalf. The disagreement concerns the minor son: al-Shāfiʿī and Abū Ḥanīfah said that it is not