the act itself. Likewise, the majority agree that slave status affects the tally of divorces, and that in the case of slavery two pronouncements alone bring about irrevocable separation. They differ, however, as to whether this reduction is determined by the husband’s being a slave, the wife’s being a slave, or whichever of the two happens to be enslaved.

Accordingly, this chapter comprises three issues.

Issue One
The vast majority of jurists in the various regions hold that a divorce pronounced with the formula “three” carries the ruling of the third—and therefore final—pronouncement.

The Ẓāhirī school and a group of other scholars maintain that it counts only as a single pronouncement; the wording, they say, has no legal effect beyond that.

Their evidence is the plain sense of the Almighty’s words:
“Divorce may be pronounced twice…” (al-Baqarah 2:229)
followed by His statement regarding the third pronouncement:
“Then, if he divorces her again, she is not lawful for him thereafter until she has married another husband.” (al-Baqarah 2:230)
In their view, one who divorces with the wording “three” has in fact issued but a single divorce, not three.

They also cite the report recorded by al-Bukhārī and Muslim from Ibn ʿAbbās:
“During the lifetime of the Messenger of Allah—peace and blessings be upon him—of Abū Bakr, and for two years of ʿUmar’s caliphate, a triple divorce was treated as one; then ʿUmar enforced it against the people.”

They further appeal to what Ibn Isḥāq related, from ʿIkrimah, from Ibn ʿAbbās:
“Rukānah pronounced three divorces against his wife in a single sitting and was overwhelmed with grief. The Messenger of Allah—peace and blessings be upon him—asked him, ‘How did you divorce her?’ He replied, ‘I pronounced three divorces in one sitting.’ He said, ‘That counts as only one pronouncement; so take her back.’”

Those who defend the majority position reply that the Ibn ʿAbbās ḥadīth found in both Ṣaḥīḥs is transmitted from him only by his disciple Ṭāwūs, whereas the leading among his other students—Saʿīd ibn Jubayr, Mujāhid, ʿAṭāʾ, ʿAmr ibn Dīnār, and many others—narrated from him that all three pronouncements are binding. They also maintain that the report of Ibn Isḥāq is mistaken; trustworthy narrators relate that Rukānah issued an irrevocable divorce (al-battah), not three separate pronouncements.

The root of the disagreement is this: Does the ruling of irrevocable separation that the Law attaches to a third pronouncement take effect when a legally accountable person imposes that ruling upon himself in a single pronouncement, or is nothing binding except what the Law itself has prescribed?

Hence, those who liken divorce to acts—such as marriage and sales—whose validity depends on the fulfilment of specific legal conditions say that it does not become binding as three. Those who liken it to vows and oaths—whereby whatever obligation the servant imposes upon himself becomes binding in whatever form—hold that the divorce is binding in whatever manner the husband obliges himself.

It appears that the majority opted for the stricter ruling in divorce as a precautionary safeguard, yet by doing so they negate the legal concession and the mercy intended—namely, in His words, “Perhaps Allah will bring about, after that, a different matter” (al-Ṭalāq 65:1).

Issue Two
As for their disagreement over whether the reduction in the number of pronouncements required for an irrevocable divorce on account of slave status should be considered, some have said: