owing to the many special rulings that applied to him—peace and blessings be upon him—in this field.

The reason emancipation departs from general legal principles is that it merely removes ownership, and such removal does not in itself authorize some other form of use. Once the woman is set free she owns her own person; how, then, could she be compelled to marry?

For this reason al-Shāfiʿī said: If she dislikes marrying him she must pay him her value, for in his view her value has been lost to him, since he forfeited it on condition that he might lawfully enjoy her.

All of this, however, cannot be set against the Prophet’s own practice—peace and blessings be upon him—for had it been impermissible for others he would have stated so. The default rule is that his actions are binding upon us unless evidence proves them to have been exclusive to him.

As for the nature of the dowry, the jurists agree that a marriage is valid when it is contracted for a specified consideration that is properly described, that is, whose type and amount are precisely fixed. They differed, however, over a consideration that is neither described nor specified—such as when a man says, “I marry her to you for a slave or a servant,” without giving any description that sets its value. Mālik and Abū Ḥanīfah held that this is permissible; al-Shāfiʿī held that it is not. If a marriage is concluded on these terms, Mālik says the wife receives the median value of what was mentioned, whereas Abū Ḥanīfah obliges the husband to pay its full value.

The root of their disagreement is whether marriage, in this respect, should be treated like a sale, where the parties seek advantage through bargaining, or whether marriage does not reach that level, its purpose being chiefly honorable generosity. Whoever likens it to a sale argues: just as it is unlawful to sell something that is not described, so too such a marriage is invalid. Whoever denies the analogy—because the objective is mainly mutual courtesy—deems it valid.

With regard to deferred payment of the dowry, some jurists disallowed it altogether, while others permitted it and even recommended that the husband advance part of it when he wishes to consummate; this is Mālik’s view. Among those who allow deferment, some permit it only for a fixed period—also Mālik’s position—while others allow it to be deferred until death or separation, which is the opinion of al-Awzāʿī.

Their disagreement turns on whether marriage resembles sale in the matter of deferment. Those who perceive the resemblance do not allow postponement until death or separation; those who deny the resemblance permit it. As for those who forbid any deferment, they do so because they regard marriage as an act of worship.

The Second Issue: Establishing the Wife’s Entitlement to the Entire Dowry

The scholars concur that the entire dowry becomes due upon consummation or upon death. Its becoming due through consummation is based on the Almighty’s words:

“If you desire to replace one wife with another and you have given one of them a treasure, do not take anything from it” (al-Nisāʾ 4:20).

As for its becoming due through death, I know at present of no transmitted proof save the consensus that has formed on the matter.

They disagreed whether physical intercourse is required for the dowry to become obligatory after entry, or whether seclusion alone—which they describe as “drawing the curtains”—is sufficient. Mālik, al-Shāfiʿī, and Dāwūd held that mere seclusion obliges only half the bridal-due so long as intercourse has not occurred. Abū Ḥanīfah maintained that seclusion itself makes the entire dowry due, unless the husband is in a state of iḥrām, is ill, is fasting in Ramadan, or the woman is menstruating. Ibn Abī Laylā ruled that the whole dowry becomes due upon entry, without stipulating any further condition.

The cause of their disagreement is that the rulings of the Companions appear to conflict with the plain sense of the Qur’anic text, for the Blessed and Exalted has explicitly stated with regard to a wife whose marriage has been consummated that nothing may be taken back from her dowry, in His words: