The later scholars who engaged in systematic reasoning have said: “The Hijazis’ case, insofar as it rests on transmitted texts, is the stronger, whereas the Iraqis’ case, insofar as it rests on analogy, is the clearer.” If that is so, the dispute ultimately turns on whether, when the two conflict, precedence is to be given to textual evidence over analogy or to analogy over textual evidence—an issue over which there is itself disagreement. The truth, however, is that whenever a sound and explicit text exists, it must override analogy. When, on the other hand, the apparent wording admits interpretation, the examiner must deliberate: should the two be reconciled by construing the wording, or should the wording’s outward sense prevail over the dictates of analogy? The answer varies according to the strength of the particular text and of the competing analogy, and the difference can be perceived only by an intellectual discernment, much as one distinguishes measured speech from unmeasured; at times both discernments may appear equally balanced. Hence disagreement in this area has multiplied to the point that many have said, “Every mujtahid is correct.”
The Qāḍī says: What seems most evident to me—Allah knows best—is that the Prophet’s statement, peace and blessings be upon him, “Every intoxicant is forbidden,” although it could conceivably be taken to refer to the intoxicating amount rather than the intoxicating genus, appears more strongly to attach the prohibition to the genus than to the amount. The Kūfans’ analogy does not suffice to set it aside, for it is not improbable that the Lawgiver should forbid both small and large quantities of an intoxicant as a preventive measure and a deterrent, even though the actual harm is found only in the larger amount.
By consensus it is established that in the case of wine the Law considered the genus rather than the specific quantity; therefore, everything in which the cause for wine’s prohibition is present must be assimilated to wine, and the burden of proof rests on anyone who claims a valid distinction—unless they concede to us the authenticity of his saying, peace and blessings be upon him, “Whatever intoxicates in large amounts, a small amount of it is unlawful.” If they accept that ḥadīth, no way out remains, for it is an explicit text on the very point in dispute, and texts cannot rightly be opposed by analogies.
Moreover, the Law has informed us that wine contains both harm and benefit, for the Exalted said, “Say: In them is grave sin and [yet] benefits for people” (2:219). Were the aim to combine the removal of harm with the retention of benefit, analogy would dictate that the large amount be prohibited and the small amount permitted. Yet when the Lawgiver weighed harm more heavily than benefit in the case of wine and forbade both its small and its large quantities, the same ruling had to apply to everything that shares the cause of wine’s prohibition—unless a legally recognized distinction can be established.
They are unanimously agreed that preparing nabīdh is lawful so long as the drink has not developed the intoxicating, wine-like potency, because of his saying, peace and blessings be upon him, “Prepare nabīdh, but every intoxicant is forbidden,” and the authentic report that “He would prepare nabīdh and pour it out on the second or third day.” They nonetheless differed on two subsidiary questions, the first of which concerns the vessels in which nabīdh may be prepared.