and Abū Hurayrah. The reason they differ is that the plain sense of the Qur’anic text appears, in this question, to run counter to the prophetic report.

As for the Qur’an, the relevant proof-text is His saying, Exalted is He:
“Do not eat of that over which the name of Allah has not been mentioned; to do so is surely sinful.” (al-Anʿām 6:121)

The Sunnah that seems to oppose this verse is the ḥadith transmitted by Mālik, from Hishām, from his father, who said:
“The Messenger of Allah—may Allah bless him and grant him peace—was asked: ‘Messenger of Allah, people from the desert bring us meat and we do not know whether they pronounced Allah’s name over it or not.’ He replied, ‘Pronounce the name of Allah over it yourselves and then eat.’”

Mālik concluded that the verse abrogates this ḥadith, interpreting the ḥadith as having occurred in the earliest days of Islam. Al-Shāfiʿī did not share that view, for the ḥadith, on its face, was set in Madinah, whereas the verse of tasmiya is Meccan. Al-Shāfiʿī therefore opted for reconciliation, holding that the command to mention Allah’s name is meant as a recommendation, not an unqualified obligation.

Those who make the mention obligatory yet excuse forgetfulness rest their case on the Prophet’s—peace be upon him—words: “My community has been pardoned for mistakes, forgetfulness, and what they are forced to do.”

Issue Two: Facing the Qiblah
Regarding orienting the animal toward the qiblah at the moment of slaughter, some scholars recommended it, others deemed it merely permissible, others declared it obligatory, and still others disliked the failure to do so. Both disapproval and outright prohibition are found within the school. Yet the matter is one on which the revealed texts are silent; the presumption is permissibility unless proof dictates otherwise. Nothing in the Sharīʿah provides a definitive basis for analogy here, save recourse to an “unrestricted” qiyās—analogy lacking a specific precedent, according to those who allow it—or to a tenuous resemblance: the qiblah is a venerated direction and slaughter is an act of worship, so orientation should be required. This, however, is weak, for not every act of worship demands a specific direction besides prayer, and likening slaughter to prayer—or to orienting the deceased toward the qiblah—is remote.

Issue Three: Requiring Intention
As for making intention a condition, one view within the school declares it obligatory, and at present I know of no contrary opinion outside the madhhab, though in principle two positions are conceivable: one obligating it and one not.

Those who oblige it argue: slaughter is an act of worship for which both a particular quality and a specific number are stipulated; accordingly, intention must be among its conditions.

Those who do not oblige it say: it is a rational act whose goal—causing the animal’s life to cease—is achieved without intention, so intention is not required, just as removing the actual substance of impurity needs no particular intention.