Sixth Question
Does an animal that at times lives on land and at other times in the sea require ritual slaughter (dhakāh) or not?

First Question
Concerning the throttled, the beaten, the one that has fallen, the gored, and that of which a beast of prey has eaten: the scholars, as far as I have been able to ascertain, agree that if the strangulation or the blow has not reached the point where survival is deemed impossible, then dhakāh is operative. In other words, so long as it is more likely that the animal will live—and this is the case when no lethal organ has been struck—ritual slaughter renders it lawful.

They differ, however, when it is more probable that the animal will perish because a vital organ has been injured or for some other reason. One group holds that dhakāh is still effective; this is the position of Abū Ḥanīfah, the well-known view of al-Shāfiʿī, and the opinion reported from al-Zuhrī and Ibn ʿAbbās. Another group maintains that dhakāh does not avail in such circumstances. Both views are related from Mālik, though the more prevalent is that dhakāh does not apply to an animal from which recovery is despaired.

Some within the Mālikī school have interpreted “hopeless” animals to be of two kinds: (1) those whose hopelessness is uncertain, and (2) those whose death is certain—namely, one whose vital organs have been pierced (with further disagreement as to what exactly constitutes a vital organ). As for the doubtful case, two well-known reports exist within the school. As for the animal whose vital organs have been penetrated, the transmitted doctrine agrees that dhakāh is of no effect, although a weak line of reasoning can be found that would permit it.

The reason for their divergence is their differing understanding of the Almighty’s words:
“except for what you slaughter” (al-Māʾidah 5:3).
Is this a connected exception, by which some of what the general term covers—namely, the throttled, the beaten, the fallen, the gored, and that partially eaten by a beast of prey—is removed from the ruling, as is usual with connected exceptions? Or is it a disconnected exception that has no bearing on the preceding clause, which is likewise a recognized usage in Arabic speech?

Whoever says it is connected maintains that dhakāh is effective in these five categories. Whoever says it is disconnected holds that dhakāh does not apply to them.

Those who argue for a connected exception cite the consensus that dhakāh is effective when the animal’s survival is still hoped for; this, they say, shows that the exception has operative force and is therefore connected.

Those who regard it as disconnected reply that the prohibition is not attached to the very bodies of these five categories while they are alive; it relates to them only after death, and therefore the exception must be disconnected. For the meaning of His words, “Carrion has been forbidden to you” (al-Māʾidah 5:3), is “the flesh of the dead animal,” and likewise the flesh of one that has been battered, fallen, gored, and the rest—that is, the flesh of an animal rendered dead by these causes, apart from one that dies of itself, which is what Arabs most often mean by maytah (carrion) in ordinary or literal usage.

They continue: Since it is clear that the prohibition was not meant to attach to these animals while they are alive, but only after they have died—bearing in mind that the flesh of a living animal is forbidden by virtue of the requirement of dhakāh and by the Prophet’s statement, “Whatever is cut from a living animal is carrion”—it follows that His words, “except for what you slaughter” (al-Māʾidah 5:3)