Or it may be said that these two mosques are also visited for the sake of voluntary prayer, in view of the Prophet’s—peace and blessings be upon him—statement:
“One prayer in this mosque of mine is better than a thousand prayers elsewhere, except for the Sacred Mosque.”
Since the word “prayer” embraces both the obligatory and the supererogatory, he concluded that the vow is binding. Abū Ḥanīfah, however, construed this ḥadīth as referring only to the obligatory prayer, seeking thereby to reconcile it with the Prophet’s—peace be upon him—saying: “The prayer one of you performs in his house is better than his prayer in this mosque of mine, except for the prescribed prayer.” Otherwise, the two reports would appear contradictory. In truth, this question more properly belongs to the second category than to the present one.

Fourth Issue
The jurists differed over what is incumbent upon a person who vows to slaughter his son at the Maqām Ibrāhīm.
• Mālik held that he must slaughter a camel as a ransom for him.
• Abū Ḥanīfah said that he should slaughter a sheep; this is also narrated from Ibn ʿAbbās.
• Some maintained that he must slaughter a hundred camels.
• Others said he should give the son’s blood-money, a view reported from ʿAlī.
• Yet others held that he should perform ḥajj on the son’s behalf; this was the opinion of al-Layth.
• Abū Yūsuf and al-Shāfiʿī ruled that nothing is required of him, because the vow entails sin, and there is no valid vow in matters of sin.

The basis of their disagreement is the story of Abraham—upon him be peace. The question is whether Abraham’s act of devotion is binding on the Muslim community or not. Whoever regarded it as legislation peculiar to Abraham said that the vow is not binding; whoever considered it binding upon us said that the vow is binding. The broader dispute over whether the law of previous communities applies to us is well known, but another consideration arises here: the apparent sense of the incident is that it was specific to Abraham and not a law even for the people of his own time. On that premise, there ought to be no disagreement over whether it is legislation for us.

Those who viewed it as legislation then differed about what exactly is obligatory. They disagreed whether the required act should match what was incumbent upon Abraham himself, or whether it should take another recognised Islamic form of devotion—such as giving charity equal to the blood-money, performing ḥajj on the son’s behalf, or offering a sacrificial camel.

Those who stipulated one hundred camels based their view on the report concerning ʿAbd al-Muṭṭalib.

Fifth Issue
The scholars agree that if someone vows to devote all his wealth “in the path of Allah,” or to some other channel of righteousness, the vow is binding and cannot be discharged by expiation, provided it is phrased as a declarative vow rather than a conditional one—this is what they term an oath.
They disagreed, however, about a conditional vow, such as a person saying, “My wealth is for the poor if I do such-and-such,” and then doing it. Some held that it is binding, like a declarative vow, and that no expiation is due. This is Mālik’s view regarding vows framed in this fashion: no expiation applies. Others said that the obligation