—of honey.

Muslim also relates on the authority of Ibn ʿAbbās that he said,

“If a man declares his wife forbidden to himself, that is an oath for which he must offer the prescribed expiation.”

He then recited, “Indeed, in the Messenger of Allah you have a good example” (al-Aḥzāb 33:21).

SECTION THREE
Identifying what becomes obligatory by reason of a vow and the rulings that pertain to it

Issue One – What is required when the vow is unrestricted

Section Three concerns determining the obligation that follows from a vow and its legal consequences. As for the jurists’ disagreement about what exactly becomes due in the various types of vows, the points of contention are many. We shall confine ourselves to the well-known questions—those most closely connected to explicit legal wording—in accordance with the method we follow in this book. There are five issues in all.

Issue One: They differed over what is binding in the case of an unrestricted vow—when the person making it specifies nothing beyond saying, “I owe Allah a vow.”

• Many scholars held that the only thing required is the expiation for breaking an oath.
• Others said that the expiation for ẓihār is required.
• A third group maintained that the vow obliges the smallest act of devotion to which the term “vow” can apply: fasting a single day or performing two rakʿahs of prayer.

The majority opted for the oath-expiation on the strength of the authenticated report from ʿUqbah ibn ʿĀmir, in which the Prophet—peace and blessings be upon him—said, “The expiation for a vow is the expiation for an oath,” a ḥadīth recorded by Muslim.

Those who required fasting a day or praying two rakʿahs reasoned that what suffices is the minimum to which the name “vow” can be attached, and those two acts meet that threshold. As for those who demanded the expiation for ẓihār, their view is unsupported by analogy or transmitted evidence.

Issue Two – A vow to walk to the House of Allah

The jurists agree that a vow to walk to the House of Allah is binding—that is, if someone vows to make the journey on foot. They disagreed about the ruling when he becomes unable to continue part way along the route.

• Some held that nothing is thereafter required of him.
• Others said that something is required, and they divided into three opinions regarding what that is:

1. The scholars of Medina held that he must resume walking from the point where he became incapable; if he wishes he may ride and that will suffice, but he must also offer a sacrificial animal, a view transmitted from ʿAlī.
2. The scholars of Mecca said that he need only offer a sacrificial animal and does not have to repeat the walk.
3. Mālik held that both obligations apply: he must return and walk from the point at which the walking became due, and he must offer a sacrificial animal. In his view the sacrifice is a camel, a cow, or—if neither is available—a sheep.

The root of their disagreement lies in the tension between foundational legal principles as applied to this question and the transmitted reports that appear to conflict with those principles, for the one who likened the incapacitated pilgrim—when he resumes walking a second time