A vow that is worded as a condition is also binding, provided that what is vowed is an act of devotion. The jurists deemed such a vow obligatory by virtue of the generality of the Almighty’s words:

“O you who believe, fulfil your covenants.”
(al-Māʾidah 5:1)

Allah, Exalted is He, likewise praised those who do so, saying:

“They fulfil their vows.”
(al-Insān 76:7)

And He informed us that punishment falls upon whoever violates them when He said:

“Among them are those who pledged to Allah, ‘If He grants us of His bounty…’”
(al-Tawbah 9:75) — up to His words —
“because of the lies they used to tell.”
(al-Tawbah 9:77)

The reason for their disagreement over whether one must explicitly utter the word “vow” in an unqualified vow is their dispute over this question: does a vow become obligatory through both intention and wording together, or through intention alone?

Those who require both hold that if a person says, “I owe Allah such-and-such,” without adding, “as a vow,” nothing becomes incumbent upon him, for he is merely reporting an obligation that Allah has not imposed, unless he explicitly states the basis of that obligation.

Those who do not regard explicit wording as a condition maintain that the vow is concluded even if the word itself is omitted. This is the view of Mālik — that is, in his opinion the vow is binding even when the word “vow” is left out, despite his principle that both intention and wording are normally required — because he considers the omission of the term immaterial: any formula whose form is that of a vow is intended as a vow even if the term is not pronounced. This is also the position of the majority; the first opinion is that of Saʿīd ibn al-Musayyib.

It seems that those who found an unqualified vow non-binding did so because they understood the command to fulfil vows as merely recommended. Likewise, those who stipulated that the vow must be made willingly did so on the grounds that devotional acts are valid only when undertaken voluntarily, not out of stubbornness; this is the view of al-Shāfiʿī.

Mālik, however, holds that a vow is binding no matter how it is phrased. Such, then, is their disagreement over obligation from the standpoint of wording.

As for their disagreement regarding obligation from the standpoint of the things vowed, two foundational questions arise.

First issue: they differed about a person who vows to commit a sin. Mālik, al-Shāfiʿī, and the majority of scholars said that nothing is binding upon him. Abū Ḥanīfah, Sufyān, and the Kūfan scholars said that something is binding, namely the expiation for breaking an oath, not the commission of the sin itself.

The cause of their disagreement is the conflict of the apparent texts on this matter. Two ḥadīths have been transmitted.

The first is the ḥadīth of ʿĀʾishah from the Prophet — peace and blessings be upon him — in which he said:

“Whoever vows to obey Allah, let him obey Him; and whoever vows to disobey Allah, let him not disobey Him.”

Its plain sense is that a vow to commit a sin is not binding.

The second is the ḥadīth of ʿImrān ibn Ḥuṣayn and the ḥadīth of Abū Hurayrah, both reliably attributed to the Prophet — peace and blessings be upon him — in which he said:

“There is no vow to commit sin, and its expiation is the expiation for an oath.”

This text explicitly establishes an obligation in the form of expiation.

Whoever reconciles the two states: the first ḥadīth conveys that the sinful act itself is not binding, while the second affirms the obligation of expiation. Whoever preferred the apparent wording of ʿĀʾishah’s ḥadīth because he did not deem the ḥadīth of