As for the second issue:
It is exemplified by a person who swears that he will not do something and then performs part of it, or who swears that he will do something and then omits part of it. According to Mālik, if he vows, “I will certainly eat this loaf,” and then eats only a portion of it, he is not absolved until he consumes it whole; and if he says, “I will not eat this loaf,” he breaks his oath by eating even a piece of it. Al-Shāfiʿī and Abū Ḥanīfah, however, hold that he does not break his oath in either case, construing the wording so that it requires more than the minimum denoted by the term.

Mālik’s distinction between action and abstention is not based on a single principle: in the case of abstention he applies the least that the wording entails, whereas in the case of action he requires the full extent of what the wording covers—apparently out of precaution.

As for the third issue:
This concerns situations in which a person swears about a specific matter and yet the wording suggests an intention broader—or narrower—than the thing explicitly mentioned; or he swears about something while inwardly intending a broader or narrower meaning; or the object of the oath has two names, one linguistic and the other customary, one of them more specific than the other. If he swears about a determinate object, then according to al-Shāfiʿī and Abū Ḥanīfah he does not break his oath unless a contravention occurs with respect to that very object, even if customary usage would render the expression broader or narrower.

Likewise, so far as I can tell, they do not take account of an intention that diverges from the wording; they consider only the bare expressions themselves.

Mālik, on the other hand, is widely reported to hold that in oaths over which no judge rules against the swearer, the primary consideration is the intention; if that is unknown, then the circumstances; if those are lacking, then customary usage; and finally, the linguistic signification. Another view states that only the intention, or the apparent linguistic wording, is taken into account; yet another says that one considers the intention and the factual context, but not custom.

With respect to oaths upon which judgment is passed against their taker: if the swearer comes seeking a legal opinion, the ruling follows the same order as in oaths that are not adjudicated—intention, circumstances, custom, then language. But if it is an oath over which judgment is actually rendered against him, nothing is regarded except the wording itself, unless a circumstantial or customary indication corroborates the intention he claims that contradicts the outward wording.

As for the fourth issue:
They are unanimously agreed that in litigation an oath is construed according to the intention of the one who demands it. They differ, however, in other contexts—such as oaths concerning promises. Some say it is governed by the intention of the swearer; others say by the intention of the one who administers the oath. It is authentically established that the Messenger of Allah—peace and blessings be upon him—said: “The oath is according to the intention of the one who exacts it,” and he also said, “Your oath is according to what your companion accepts from you as true.” Muslim relates both ḥadīths.

Those who hold that an oath follows the intention of the swearer take into account the inward meaning present in the soul of the swearer, not the outward