If, however, an exception is deemed a quality inherent in contracts, it must exert an effect even in the case of divorce, notwithstanding that the divorce has already taken place. Reflect on this, for it is self-evident.

The Mālikīs’ claim that an exception here is impossible—on the grounds that the divorce has already occurred—has no force unless they regard the exception as a preventive factor rather than a modifying quality. Consider this well, for it is manifest, God willing.

SECTION TWO OF THE SECOND SENTENCE
Inquiry into Expiations

This section rests on three foundational principles:

1. Chapter One: What incurs the violation of an oath (ḥinth), together with its conditions and rulings.
2. Chapter Two: What removes the violation—namely, the expiations.
3. Chapter Three: When does the violation cease, and to what extent?

CHAPTER ONE
On what incurs the violation of an oath, its conditions, and its rulings

The jurists are unanimously agreed that liability for violation arises from contravening the matter upon which the oath was contracted: either by doing what one swore not to do, or by failing to do what one swore to do once it is established that he has postponed the act until a time when its performance is no longer possible. This applies to an oath framed as an unrestricted undertaking, such as a man’s swearing, “I shall certainly eat this loaf,” and then someone else eats it; or to an oath whose performance is tied to a specified time, where he defers the act to a moment other than the one stipulated.

Thus, if he says, “By Allah, I will certainly do such-and-such today,” and the day ends without his doing it, he necessarily breaks his oath.

The scholars then differed over four particular questions:

1. Whether liability is incurred when the contravention occurs through forgetfulness or under coercion.
2. Whether the obligation attaches to the least amount to which the term applies, or to its entirety.
3. Whether the oath relates to the meaning exactly matching the wording, or to its implied sense that may restrict or broaden that wording.
4. Whether the oath is interpreted according to the intention of the swearer or of the one who administers the oath.

As for the first issue: Mālik treats the forgetful and the coerced as equivalent to one who acts deliberately, whereas al-Shāfiʿī holds that no violation is incurred by the forgetful or the coerced.

The root of their disagreement is the apparent conflict between the general sense of the Almighty’s words,

“But He will call you to account for what you have bound yourselves by oath” (Al-Māʾidah 5:89),

which draws no distinction between the deliberate and the forgetful, and the Prophet’s—peace and blessings be upon him—general statement,

“My community has been excused for mistakes, forgetfulness, and what they are compelled to do.”

Each of these two general texts can, in principle, be qualified by the other.