Those who restrict the notion of a binding oath to formulations that explicitly employ the language of swearing—namely, those made “by Allah, Mighty and Majestic, and by His names”—say: “No expiation is due here, for it is not an oath at all.”

Conversely, those who hold that an oath may be constituted by anything whose sanctity the Law upholds maintain that expiation is obligatory. Their argument is that swearing by an object of veneration is equivalent to swearing by the denial of that veneration: just as honoring what must be honored is required, so refraining from dishonoring it is likewise required. Hence, just as one who swears to fulfill Allah’s right is bound by his word, so too is one who swears to neglect that right.

Third Question

The majority agree concerning statements that do not involve swearing by anything but merely take the form of a self-imposed obligation linked to some condition—such as a man’s saying, “If I do such-and-such, I must walk to the House of Allah,” or, “If I do so-and-so, my slave is free, or my wife is divorced.” They hold that such undertakings become binding when they pertain to acts of devotion, or to matters that the Law renders binding once a person commits himself to them, like divorce and emancipation. They disagreed, however, about whether breaking such commitments requires expiation.

Mālik maintained that no expiation is due; should the person fail to carry out what he conditioned upon himself, he is simply sinful. Al-Shāfiʿī, Aḥmad, Abū ʿUbayd, and others held that this class of commitments does require expiation, with the exception of divorce and emancipation. Abū Thawr added that expiation is due even when one swears by emancipation. The opinion ascribed to al-Shāfiʿī is reported from ʿĀʾishah.

The root of their disagreement is whether such a statement counts as an oath or as a vow. Whoever deems it an oath obligates expiation, invoking the general verse:

“The expiation thereof is to feed ten needy persons …” (al-Māʾidah 5:89).

Whoever regards it as a kind of vow—one of the matters the Law makes binding once a person voluntarily assumes it—says that no expiation is due. This position is awkward for the Mālikīs, who themselves call it an “oath”; perhaps they do so only figuratively and by way of linguistic latitude.

In truth, linguistic usage does not require us to call it an oath, for in Arabic the term “oath” is reserved for specific formulae, and an oath is sworn only by invoking entities that are to be venerated; the conditional construction is not one of those formulae. Whether such statements are classed as oaths in legal convention and whether they take the rulings of oaths is another question. It is established that the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him) said, “The expiation for a vow is the expiation for an oath,” and that Allah, Exalted is He, said:

“Why do you forbid what Allah has made lawful for you … Allah has ordained for you a way to absolve your oaths.” (al-Taḥrīm 66:1–2)

The outward sense of these texts is that the Sharīʿah designates as an “oath” any statement cast in the form of a condition or a self-imposed obligation, even though it contains neither an explicit condition nor a formal oath. Accordingly, every declaration of this kind should be treated in that manner, except where consensus has ruled otherwise, such as in the case of divorce. The hadith plainly indicates that a vow is not itself an oath, yet its legal ruling is the ruling of an oath.

Dāwūd and the Ẓāhirīs held that none of these conditional statements becomes binding except what consensus has expressly declared binding, because they are neither vows, to which the rulings of vows would apply, nor oaths.