The first type is the one who hires himself out for no more than what will carry him in provisions and mount: should what he has taken fall short of covering the journey, he must add enough to reach the destination; but if there is any surplus beyond that, he must return it.

The second type follows the normal rules of a hire contract: if the sum proves deficient he must make up the shortfall from his own pocket, and if there is an excess it is his to keep.

The majority of jurists hold that a slave is not obliged to perform the Hajj until he is emancipated, though some of the Ẓāhirīs considered it binding on him even before that.

This completes the discussion of those upon whom the duty falls and on whose behalf it may be performed.

As for the time at which the obligation takes effect, the scholars disagreed: must it be carried out immediately, or may it be deferred? Both opinions are reported from Mālik and his companions. The dominant view among the later Mālikīs is that it may be deferred, while the Baghdād Mālikīs say it is immediate. Abū Ḥanīfah and his associates also express both views, though their preferred position is that it is immediate. Al-Shāfiʿī stated that it is a matter of broad latitude.

Those who allow latitude argue that the Hajj was made obligatory several years before the Prophet—may Allah bless him and grant him peace—performed it himself. Had the duty been immediate, he would not have postponed it; and had he delayed it because of an excuse, he would have stated that excuse.

The opposing party contends that, since Hajj is confined to a specific season, the default rule is to deem one who omits it sinful until that season passes—just as with the fixed times of prayer. They distinguish, however, between Hajj and the prayer in that the obligation of Hajj does not recur with each new season, whereas the prayer becomes obligatory anew whenever its time arrives.

In summary: whoever likens the first available Hajj season that confronts a capable person to the beginning of the prayer time concludes that the duty may be deferred; and whoever likens it to the end of the prayer time insists that it must be fulfilled at once. They liken it to the end of the prayer time because the season ends with the entrance of a period in which Hajj cannot be performed, just as the prayer time ends with the entrance of a period in which one who prays would be praying outside of time. This group also cites the risk a person incurs by delaying Hajj to the next year, for death within the span of a year is statistically likely, unlike the rare occurrence of death during the brief interval between the beginning and end of a single prayer time.

They may further say that postponing a prayer still occurs while the time in which it may validly be performed remains, whereas postponing Hajj here would carry one into a period in which the rite is invalid; the two therefore are not fully analogous. An unrestricted command, according to those who permit deferment, does not result in entering a period in which the commanded act is invalid—whereas delaying Hajj after its season has begun invariably pushes it into the following year. Hence the dispute here is not the same as the general debate over whether an unrestricted command demands immediate or deferred execution, as might be supposed.

They also differed on a related question: is a woman’s obligation to perform Hajj conditioned upon being accompanied by her husband or a male maḥram, or