“Whenever the Messenger of Allah—may blessings and peace be upon him—observed retreat, he would draw his head toward me while he remained in the mosque so that I might comb his hair, and he would not enter the house except to fulfil a bodily need.”

They differed regarding one who leaves the mosque for something other than such a need: at what point is his iʿtikāf cut off? Al-Shāfiʿī held that it is nullified the very moment he steps outside; some gave him leeway for an hour, while others allowed him the remainder of that day.

They also disagreed over whether he may enter a dwelling other than the chamber adjoining the mosque. The majority—Mālik, al-Shāfiʿī, and Abū Ḥanīfah—permitted this, whereas others regarded it as invalidating the retreat.

Mālik further allowed him to engage in buying and selling and to conduct a marriage contract; the other jurists disagreed with him on that point.

The basis of their divergence is that no explicit textual limit exists here; the matter rests on independent reasoning and on drawing analogies between what they dispute and what they agree upon.

They likewise differed as to whether the devotee may stipulate, before entering retreat, that he will attend a funeral or the like. Most jurists say such a stipulation is of no avail, and that if he acts upon it his iʿtikāf is void. Al-Shāfiʿī, however, considered the stipulation effective.

The reason for this disagreement is that some liken iʿtikāf to pilgrimage, both being acts of worship that prohibit many otherwise lawful things. Those who permit stipulation in Hajj rely on the ḥadīth of Ḍubāʿah, in which the Messenger of Allah—peace and blessings be upon him—said:

“Enter into pilgrimage and stipulate that my release is wherever You restrain me.”

But this very principle is itself contested in the context of Hajj, so the analogy appears weak to the opposing side.

They also differed when continuity has been stipulated in the vow—or when continuity is deemed intrinsic—as to what events, if they interrupt the retreat, obligate the devotee either to resume or to begin anew, such as illness. Some held that if sickness breaks the iʿtikāf he is to resume from where he left off; this is the view of Mālik, Abū Ḥanīfah, and al-Shāfiʿī. Others, including al-Thawrī, said he must start over. So far as I know they all agree that a menstruating woman resumes rather than recommencing.

They further disagreed over whether he may leave the mosque in such cases, and similarly, if the devotee becomes insane or loses consciousness, whether he resumes or must restart.

The cause of their disagreement in this chapter is the absence of any explicit ruling from revelation; contention therefore arises from their analogies between agreed-upon points within this act of worship and disputed points—whether within iʿtikāf itself or in other devotional acts that require continuity, such as the daytime fast.

The majority hold that if a voluntary iʿtikāf is broken without excuse it must be made up, because it is established that the Messenger of