“…on pastured sheep zakah is due.” Some scholars took this to mean that no zakah is owed on livestock that do not graze freely.

Legal analogy (qiyās), by contrast, is the extension of a ruling that the Law has made obligatory for a certain matter to another matter about which the Law is silent, either because the two share a resemblance or because they possess a common effective cause. Juristic analogy therefore falls into two kinds: analogy by resemblance and analogy by cause.

The difference between analogy and a specific wording that is intended to convey a general meaning is this: analogy builds on a text that was meant only for the particular case mentioned, then attaches other cases to it on account of their similarity, not because of any indication in the wording itself. To attach the unspoken to the spoken by textual implication is not analogy; it is simply a form of linguistic indication. These two categories are nonetheless very close, for both relate an unmentioned case to one that is expressly stated, and they often become confused for jurists.

A clear example of analogy is treating the drinker of wine like the slanderer (qādhif) with respect to the prescribed penalty, or treating the amount of the bride-price (ṣadaq) like the legal minimum (nisāb) in cases requiring amputation for theft. By contrast, subsuming interest-bearing commodities under staple foods, or under goods sold by measure or by weight, belongs to the category of a specific wording that is intended to be general. Reflect on this point, for it is subtle.

The first category is the one that the Ẓāhirīs may legitimately dispute; the second they should not, for it is founded on transmitted evidence, and whoever rejects it is really rejecting a type of Arabic discourse.

As for actions, the majority consider them one of the avenues from which legal rulings are derived. Some, however, maintain that actions yield no ruling at all because they lack verbal formulation. Those who do regard them as a source differ over the kind of ruling they convey: some say they indicate obligation, others recommendation. The view preferred by the exacting scholars is that when an action clarifies an ambiguous obligation it denotes obligation, and when it clarifies an ambiguous recommended matter it denotes recommendation. If the action is not intended as clarification, then, if it belongs to the realm of devotional acts, it signifies recommendation; if it belongs to matters originally permissible, it signifies permissibility.

Tacit approval (iqrār) likewise indicates permissibility.

These, then, are the various avenues from which legal rulings are received or deduced.

Consensus (ijmāʿ) rests on one of these four sources; yet when consensus occurs in connection with any of them and is not itself definitive, it elevates the ruling from predominating probability to absolute certainty. Consensus is not, therefore, an independent source in its own right without reference to one of these methods, for were it so, it would entail introducing new legislation after the Prophet—peace and blessings be upon him—without returning to any of the foundational sources of the Sharīʿah.