Section Two
On whom Zakāt al-Fiṭr is obligatory and on whose behalf it must be paid

The jurists unanimously agree that all Muslims are addressed by this duty—male and female, young and old, slave and free—on the strength of the aforementioned ḥadīth of Ibn ʿUmar. The sole exceptional view is that of al-Layth, who said, “Zakāt al-Fiṭr is not due from the desert nomads; it is only incumbent on the inhabitants of settled towns.” His position has no proof, just as there is no proof for the minority who exempted the orphan.

As for those on whose behalf it must be paid, the scholars concur that every person is obliged to pay it for himself; it is a zakāt of the person, not of property. They likewise agree that one must pay it for his minor children and for his slaves, provided they possess no wealth of their own. Beyond these cases they differ.

Mālik’s view, in summary, is that a man must pay on behalf of everyone whom the Sharīʿah obliges him to support financially, and al-Shāfiʿī agrees with him. Their disagreement lies only in who remains entitled to maintenance when the supporter is in straitened circumstances. Abū Ḥanīfah dissented with respect to the wife, holding that she must pay for herself, while Abū Thawr differed regarding a slave who owns property, saying:

“If a slave has wealth, he pays the zakāt for himself and his master does not pay for him.” This is also the position of the Ẓāhirīs.

The majority hold that a man is not required to pay Zakāt al-Fiṭr on behalf of his minor children when they possess their own wealth; this is the opinion of al-Shāfiʿī, Abū Ḥanīfah, and Mālik. Al-Ḥasan maintained that the obligation remains on the father, and that if he takes it from the child’s wealth he is liable for it.

In the view of most jurists, neither affluence nor the possession of a nisāb is a condition for this zakāt; it is enough that one has surplus beyond the sustenance of himself and his dependants. Abū Ḥanīfah and his companions said: “It is not obligatory upon one who is eligible to receive charity, for a person cannot at the same time be lawfully entitled to receive it and legally bound to pay it.” This is clear—and Allah knows best.

The majority further agree that this zakāt is not limited to a legally accountable person in his own right, as is the case with other acts of worship; it may also be obligatory by virtue of another, since it is due from minors and slaves. Those who regard guardianship as the operative cause say: “The guardian must pay the charity on behalf of everyone under his guardianship.” Those who see the obligation of maintenance as the operative cause say: “The provider must pay the zakāt for everyone he is required by law to maintain.”

The controversy arose because the minor and the slave—on whom all agree—make it clear that this zakāt is not confined to the individual himself but may be imposed through another whenever guardianship or obligatory maintenance exists. Consequently Mālik considers the effective cause to be maintenance, whereas Abū Ḥanīfah considers it guardianship, and for this reason they differed concerning the wife.

A marfūʿ report states:

“Pay Zakāt al-Fiṭr on behalf of everyone you support,”

but it is not widely authenticated.