Mālik therefore held that they are counted, whereas al-Shāfiʿī, Abū Ḥanīfah, and Abū Thawr said that suckling young are not counted unless the dams themselves already constitute a niṣāb.
The cause of their disagreement lies in the possible meanings of ʿUmar’s—may Allah be pleased with him—instruction that the sucklings be tallied against the owners yet that nothing be taken from them: some understood this restriction to apply only when the sucklings make up a niṣāb, while others took it absolutely.
I am inclined to think that the Ẓāhirīs impose nothing on the sucklings at all; they do not even count them—whether or not the dams reach the niṣāb—because, in their view, the generic term does not cover the young.
Most jurists agree that commingling (khulṭah) affects the amount of zakāt due. Among those who accept this, however, there is a further dispute: does commingling also affect the niṣāb, or not? Abū Ḥanīfah and his companions denied any effect altogether, whether on the amount owed or on the niṣāb itself.
To clarify: Mālik, al-Shāfiʿī, and the majority of the jurists in the provinces concur that partners pay zakāt as though they were a single owner. They nevertheless differ in two points.
First, regarding the partners’ niṣāb: Is the aggregate treated as one owner’s niṣāb—whether or not each partner individually possesses a niṣāb—or is a joint assessment made only when each partner has a niṣāb of his own?
Second, what kind of commingling is sufficient to produce this effect?
As for their initial disagreement over whether commingling influences the niṣāb and the amount due, its root lies in how they understand the Prophet’s—peace and blessings be upon him—statement recorded in the “Book of Alms”:
“No separated property is to be combined, nor combined property separated, for fear of zakāt; and whatever belongs to two partners, they shall divide it equally between them.”
Each group interpreted the ḥadīth in line with its own presuppositions. Those who held that commingling affects either both the niṣāb and the liability, or the liability alone, argued that the words:
“Whatever belongs to two partners, they shall divide it equally,”
and:
“No separated property is to be combined, nor combined property separated,”
clearly show that the property of two partners is treated like that of a single owner. They regarded this report as a qualifier of his—peace and blessings be upon him—saying,
“No zakāt is due on fewer than five camels,”
restricting it, according to Mālik and his followers, to the amount owed, and according to al-Shāfiʿī and his followers, to both the amount and the niṣāb.
Those who denied any effect to commingling replied that two partners may indeed be called “comrades,” yet it is also possible that the Prophet’s—peace and blessings be upon him—words, “No separated property is to be combined, nor combined property separated,” are merely a prohibition addressed to the zakāt collectors, forbidding them to subdivide the property of one man in a manner that increases his liability—such as a man who owns one hundred and twenty sheep and has them divided into three flocks of forty each—or to combine the property of one man with that of another