Indication may occur by mentioning what is higher so as to include what is lower, by mentioning what is lower so as to include what is higher, or by mentioning one thing so as to include its equal. An example of the first is the Exalted One’s words:
“Forbidden to you are carrion, blood, and the flesh of swine” (Qur’an, 5:3).
The Muslims are unanimously agreed that the term “swine” covers every species of swine, unless the name is applied to something else only by homonymy, such as the so-called “sea-pig.”
An example of a general wording intended for a specific application is His, Exalted be He, saying:
“Take from their wealth a charity by which you purify and cleanse them” (Qur’an, 9:103).
All Muslims agree that zakah is not obligatory on every kind of wealth.
An example of a specific wording intended for a general meaning is His, Exalted be He, statement:
“Do not even say to them, ‘Uff!’” (Qur’an, 17:23).
This belongs to the category of indicating the higher through mention of the lower, for from it one understands the prohibition of striking, reviling, and anything more serious than that.
The act that is being requested may appear in the form of an imperative, or in an indicative clause that is meant as an imperative. Likewise, what is being requested to be left may come either in the form of an explicit prohibition or in an indicative clause intended as a prohibition. When such expressions occur, does the demand to act necessarily signify obligation or recommendation—as will be clarified under the definitions of what is obligatory (wājib) and recommended (mandūb)—or must one suspend judgment until external evidence decides between the two? On this point the scholars differ, as recorded in the works on legal theory. The same applies to the forms of prohibition: do they denote mere reprehensibility (karāhah), absolute prohibition (taḥrīm), or neither? Here, too, the aforementioned disagreement exists.
As for the entities to which the ruling is attached, the wording that points to them either conveys a single meaning only—this is what the jurists call a naṣṣ, and there is no disagreement that it must be acted upon—or it conveys more than one meaning. The latter is of two kinds:
- The wording indicates those meanings equally; this is known in legal theory as the mujmal, and there is agreement that it does not, by itself, establish a ruling.
- The wording indicates some of those meanings more strongly than others. With respect to the meanings for which its indication is stronger it is called ẓāhir (apparent), and with respect to the meanings for which its indication is weaker it is called muḥtamal (possible). When such a word occurs without qualification, it is carried upon the meaning in which it is most apparent until evidence obliges its application to the less probable meaning. Because of this, disagreement may arise among the jurists concerning the statements of the Lawgiver, yet this disagreement stems from three causes:
a. homonymy in the very word designating the object to which the ruling is attached;
b. homonymy in the definite article attached to the genus of that object—does it intend the whole or only a part?;
c. the homonymy that exists in the expressions of commands and prohibitions themselves.
The fourth method is to infer from the imposition of a ruling upon a given thing the negation of that ruling for everything else, or from the negation of a ruling concerning a given thing its affirmation for what lies outside that thing. This is what is known as dalīl al-khiṭāb (the argument from the wording), and it is a disputed principle. An example is the Prophet’s—peace and blessings be upon him—statement: “With respect to pastured…"