As for those who gave precedence to the ḥadīth of Dhū al-Yadayn, they held that the prostration should be performed after the closing salām. They supported the superiority of this report by saying that the ḥadīth of Ibn Buhaynah is counterbalanced by the narration of al-Mughīrah ibn Shuʿbah:
“He—peace and blessings be upon him—stood up after two rakʿahs without sitting, then made the two prostrations after the salām.”
Abū ʿUmar remarked, “Nothing comparable in reliability has been transmitted that could be set against this report.”
They further appealed to the authentic ḥadīth of Ibn Masʿūd:
“The Messenger of God—peace and blessings be upon him—once prayed five rakʿahs through forgetfulness, and performed the prostration of forgetfulness after the salām.”
Those who chose the path of reconciliation said, “These ḥadīths do not contradict one another. In them, prostration after the salām is prescribed for an addition, whereas prostration before the salām is prescribed for an omission. Consequently, the ruling for prostration in all other circumstances should follow this principle. This is preferable to treating the ḥadīths as conflicting.”
Those who combined reconciliation with preference asserted, “The worshipper should prostrate in the very situations—and in the very manner—in which the Messenger of God, peace and blessings be upon him, prostrated, for that is the ruling specific to those instances. As for situations in which the Messenger of God—peace and blessings be upon him—did not prostrate, the ruling is to prostrate before the salām.” In effect, they made analogy with the cases in which he prostrated before the salām but not with the cases in which he prostrated after it, leaving each reported instance exactly as it stands. By preserving the rulings of those particular cases and recognizing them as distinct, they achieved a kind of reconciliation that removes any apparent conflict. Yet by extending the purport of some reports—but not others—to matters left unspoken, they engaged in a form of preference; that is, they drew analogy only from the prostrations that precede the salām.
Those who saw no ruling beyond the actions themselves, confining each to its own context—the Literalists—restricted the prostration to those specific occurrences alone.
Aḥmad ibn Ḥanbal adopted a view that blends the approach of the Literalists with that of the analogists: he limited the post-salām prostration, as we have stated, to the very occasions for which a textual report exists, without extending it, yet he did extend the prostration that is reported as occurring before the salām.
Each of these schools marshals proofs by means of analogy to support its position—speaking here of those who accept analogy—and our aim in this book is not, for the most part, to enumerate the disagreements that analogy gives rise to, just as it is not