the implicit purport of that ḥadith. Al-Shāfiʿī, however, also relied on a more general legal maxim, namely the Prophet’s—peace and blessings be upon him—saying: “The burden of error and forgetfulness has been lifted from my community.”

As for Abū Ḥanīfah, he took the traditions prohibiting speech in prayer at their full face value, judged them to abrogate the ḥadith of Dhu’l-Yadayn, and held that the latter had occurred earlier.

Chapter Eight
On the Intention (niyyah) and the Manner in Which It Is Required for the Prayer

With regard to intention, the scholars are unanimously agreed that it is a condition for the validity of the prayer, for prayer is the foremost act of worship legislated without any discernible worldly benefit—that is, without any tangible, material advantage.

They differed, however, on whether it is a prerequisite that the follower’s intention coincide with the imam’s in specifying the particular prayer and in its obligatory status. According to those who require such agreement, it is impermissible for a follower to pray Ẓuhr behind an imam who is performing ʿAṣr, or for an imam to pray Ẓuhr as a voluntary act while it counts as an obligation for the congregation.

Mālik and Abū Ḥanīfah held that the follower’s intention must match the imam’s, whereas al-Shāfiʿī maintained that no such correspondence is required.

The reason for their divergence is the tension between the implicit sense of the Prophet’s statement, “The imam has only been appointed to be followed,” and the ḥadith of Muʿādh, who would pray with the Prophet—peace and blessings be upon him—then return and lead his own people in prayer.

Whoever considered the concession granted to Muʿādh to be unique to him, and understood the general wording “The imam has only been appointed to be followed” to include the intention, stipulated that the follower’s intention must accord with the imam’s.

Conversely, whoever regarded the permission given to Muʿādh as extending to every legally responsible person—and deemed that to be the default—argued: The second ḥadith (about following the imam) must be interpreted in one of two ways. Either its general wording does not cover the intention—its outward sense relates solely to actions—in which case it does not conflict with the ḥadith of Muʿādh; or it does cover the intention, in which case the ḥadith of Muʿādh restricts that generality.

There are other questions concerning intention that are not connected to any explicit textual evidence; we have chosen to omit them, for our present purpose is to discuss only those issues that hinge upon a clear scriptural statement.