intended there. The interpretation that this refers to a case after rejection is unsound, because their established position concerning a wife is that her charitable donation or gift does not become binding upon her after the marriage ends—even if the property remains in her possession—if her husband had rejected it. Their disagreement concerns only emancipation, as we shall explain. There is even greater reason for there to be no disagreement in the slave’s case, given the stronger restrictions a master exercises over his slave.

On the view that a wife’s dispositions exceeding one-third of her property are ineffective until her husband approves them, her emancipation and charitable donation ought not to become binding upon her, even if the property remains in her possession, undisposed of, until he dies or divorces her before learning of her act, or before rejecting it if he already knew. I have indeed encountered this view among some of Mālik’s companions.

If the husband rejects her act and the property remains in her possession, undisposed of, until the marriage ends, neither the gift nor the charitable donation becomes binding upon her. As for emancipation, there are three positions:

The first is that she is not required to carry it out, whether by fatwa or judicial ruling. This is Ashhab’s position.

The second is that she is compelled to carry it out by judicial ruling. This is the position of Ibn al-Mājishūn and Mutarrif.

The third is that she is instructed to carry it out, but no judgment compelling her to do so is issued. This is Ibn al-Qāsim’s position.

There is also disagreement over whether, if the husband does not learn of her act until she has died, he may reject it after her death. Both positions are expressly recorded in the school. They follow the disagreement over whether her disposition is valid unless rejected, or ineffective until approved.

As for a slave’s gift or emancipation of another slave, if his master remains unaware of it, or learns of it but neither rejects nor approves it before the slave himself is emancipated, while the property remains in his possession, the disposition becomes binding upon him. I know of no expressly stated disagreement on this point. This indicates that his disposition is valid unless rejected. This is also what analogy requires, given our explanation that his ownership is valid according to Mālik’s school. Nevertheless, the differing position we have related from some of Mālik’s companions concerning the wife, weak though it is, extends in principle to the slave’s case.

Section

If the slave disposes of the property in his possession by sale or gift before he himself is emancipated, the charitable donation and emancipation become void. This is stated concerning charitable donation in the Book of Spiritual Retreat; emancipation is treated analogously, unless a distinction is drawn between the two