and for cash—even if he has not been authorized to trade on credit. He is liable for the debts he incurs in every kind of trade, even if he has been authorized to engage in only one kind, according to Ibn al-Qāsim’s position in al-Mudawwana. There is no difference between restricting him from trading on credit and restricting him from a particular kind of trade. This is also Asbagh’s position concerning restrictions on credit transactions. Sahnūn, however, held that he may not trade on credit if he has been prohibited from doing so. His position necessarily entails the same ruling when he is prohibited from a particular kind of trade—unless the restriction is publicly proclaimed and announced in either case, in which event the resulting debt is not binding. This was stated by some of the scholars of Sicily. It is sound in substance and can be inferred from evidence in al-Mudawwana and al-Utbiyya. He may not use his property for acts of generosity except those conducive to trade. His gifts, charitable donations, and emancipations of slaves are subject to his master’s approval or rejection. If his master does not learn of them until he has been emancipated, they take effect and become binding upon the former slave, and his master has no right to reject them.

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Comparable cases include a married woman’s emancipation of slaves, gifts, and charitable donations exceeding one-third of her property without her husband’s permission; a debtor’s emancipation of slaves without his creditors’ permission; and a financially imprudent person’s emancipation of slaves, whether with or without his guardian’s permission.

As for the debtor, his emancipation and charitable donation become binding upon him if the property concerned remains in his possession until the impediment is removed through the discharge of his debt. If, before the debt is discharged, he has transferred it out of his possession by sale or a similar transaction, that disposition takes effect, and nothing further is binding upon him. This applies whether or not the ruler has rejected the emancipation, because the ruler’s rejection does not invalidate it; rather, it suspends it until the debtor’s circumstances can be ascertained.

As for the wife, the established position of Mālik and his companions is that if her husband was unaware, or knew but neither rejected nor approved her act before dying or divorcing her, it becomes binding upon her. Consider, however, whether, if she had already disposed of the property by sale or gift before the marriage ended, the sale or gift should be annulled and her emancipation or charitable donation enforced, or not. The Book of Spiritual Retreat in al-Mudawwana states that a female slave’s charitable donation does not become binding upon her after emancipation unless the property remains in her possession. It is nevertheless possible to distinguish between the two cases by saying that the wife’s emancipation and charitable donation become binding upon her, whether or not the property remains in her possession, if her husband did not reject them before the marriage ended. This is because a master’s restriction of his slave is stronger than a husband’s restriction of his wife. The case in the Book of Spiritual Retreat does not expressly state that this occurred before rejection—and this is the meaning