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This concerns the craftsman who offers his services to the public. As for an exclusively employed craftsman who does not offer his services to the public, he bears no liability for the goods on which he is engaged to work, whether they are handed over to him or he works on them in their owner’s home. According to Mālik’s school, it makes no difference whether the craftsman works for payment or without payment. Abū Hanīfah disagreed, exempting him from liability when he works without payment, since he then resembles a depositary in his view. Al-Shāfi‘ī disagreed with both, exempting him from liability whether he works for payment or without it.

The argument against him is that holding such craftsmen liable was a matter of consensus among the Companions—may Allah be pleased with them. ‘Umar ibn al-Khattāb and ‘Alī ibn Abī Tālib ruled that they were liable, and ‘Alī said, “Nothing else will safeguard people’s interests.” Yahyā ibn Sa‘īd said, “The caliphs consistently held craftsmen liable.” With so many Companions still present, the caliphs would not have held them liable without consulting them and securing the agreement of their leading members. They have claimed that another report from ‘Alī—may Allah be pleased with him—supports their position, but it has not been established. Even if it were established, it would be understood that he subsequently abandoned that view in favour of the collective position. The consensus of the Companions is binding upon those who come after them.

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Another rational argument against them is that, since craftsmen receive goods for their own benefit, their account of the goods’ destruction carries no binding force, as with profit-sharing investments according to their school, and with borrowed property. If they say, “The borrower is held liable only because he receives the property solely for his own benefit, whereas craftsmen receive it both for their own benefit and for that of the owners,” we reply: “We do not concede that they receive it for their own benefit and that of the owners. Rather, they receive it solely for their own benefit, as shown by their offering their services for this purpose. The owner’s benefiting is merely a condition for the recipient to obtain his own benefit.” Even if we conceded that they share in the benefit, profit-sharing investment would invalidate that distinction, since both parties share in its benefit.

If they say, “The reason for holding the recipient of profit-sharing capital liable is that it constitutes a transfer of ownership without compensation,” the answer is that the grounds for liability may differ: in some cases liability may arise for that reason, and in others for a different reason—namely, the considerations of public interest and blocking the means to harm that we have mentioned.