that it applies only to intercourse, and not to the acts leading to it, do not deem zihār binding. This disagreement rests on their differing interpretations of the words of Allah, Mighty and Majestic:

“Before they touch one another” [al-Mujādila: 3].

Is this understood generally to include intercourse and lesser forms of intimacy, or is it restricted to intercourse alone? This has already been discussed. Al-Lakhmī applied this same disagreement to a man’s saying to his wife, “Kissing you or touching you is to me like my mother’s back.” Consider this.

If, however, intercourse is precluded by an impediment affecting the validity of ownership, such as a contract of manumission or an agreement to emancipate her at a specified future date, or affecting the validity of marriage, such as conditions that invalidate the marriage and necessitate its dissolution, then zihār does not become binding concerning her through his saying, “She is to me like my mother’s back.” The exception is if he intends it to apply, in the case of a woman with whom he has contracted an invalid marriage or a slave woman whose emancipation is deferred to a specified date, if he marries her; or, in the case of a woman under a contract of manumission, if she defaults on that contract or he marries her.

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A related case has been disputed: a Zoroastrian man embraces Islam while married to a Zoroastrian woman, then pronounces zihār concerning her, and she embraces Islam shortly afterwards. Ibn al-Qāsim said that zihār is binding upon him. Since she embraced Islam shortly afterwards and remained married to him, this shows that his pronouncement of zihār occurred while the marriage bond still existed. He was merely barred from intimacy with her by a temporary impediment that did not affect the validity of the marriage, comparable to menstruation or devotional retreat.

Ashhab said that zihār is not binding upon him. Ibn Yūnus explained: “Because she was not his wife at that time.” This is incorrect, for had she not been his wife, she could not have returned to him without a new marriage contract. Rather, she was his wife at that time, but she had the option of separating from him by choosing her own religion and remaining upon it. The fact that separation lay in her hands does not prevent zihār from taking effect concerning her. Do you not see that if a man says to his wife, “If I marry another woman while married to you, you shall have the authority to effect a threefold divorce,” then marries another woman and pronounces zihār concerning the first wife, that zihār is binding upon him?

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Consider the following case according to Ibn al-Qāsim’s position. A man pronounces zihār concerning his wife immediately upon embracing Islam, at a time when, had she embraced Islam, their marriage would have continued. Islam is then presented to her, but she refuses, and they are separated. She subsequently embraces Islam, and he marries her. Does the zihār become binding upon him again concerning her, or not? If you say that his conversion to Islam does not dissolve the marriage bond unless